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Abstract 
Climate change induced migration is sometimes pictured as an urgent up-coming crisis that could 
result in waves of international refugees and violent conflicts, and sometimes as part of human 
history. It is a contested topic, an issue that divides actors and that still has no agreed upon 
definition. To get a better understanding of the debate, this thesis sets out to display the main 
discussions and perspectives on climate change induced migration and to elaborate on the 
implications that different policy proposals might bring.  
Through a literature review, main debates and perspectives are identified resulting in the choice 
of two contesting perspectives to analyse, the climate migrant and the climate refugee 
perspectives. By analysing the perspectives on a case of climate change induced migration, 
Bangladesh, debates regarding different types of migration as well as the causes of the 
phenomenon are elaborated and the implications regarding policy recommendations following the 
approach of one perspective or the other discussed, bringing theory and reality together.  
The analysis explores the complex nature of climate change induced migration. It is found that 
the different perspectives focus on different aspects of the phenomenon, including contesting 
views on causes and effects. Gaps in both perspectives’ policy recommendations are found and it 
is argued that there is a need for an approach that recognises the needs of the people affected, but 
that is also adapted to the current context of international climate change politics. 
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1. Introduction 
People have in all times relocated because of changes in the environment, so on the one 
hand climate change induced migration could be seen as something that has always 
existed, a never ending story. On the other hand, the upcoming and future challenges 
caused by anthropogenic climate change could be seen as something new, resulting in 
severe implications, waves of international mass-migration and violent conflicts if not 
addressed, and in a worst case scenario, the beginning of the end.  
If there is one thing that can be agreed upon regarding climate change induced migration 
it is that the topic is contested, a question that divides institutions, politicians and people.  
Political actors, writers and researchers are debating the best strategy to handle this 
upcoming or, as some claim, existing challenge.  
Climate change induced migration has been and is discussed on several different levels of 
policymaking, and within different fields of research. Neither an acknowledged 
definition, nor a common stand point on actions to be taken by the international 
community, exists. The topic divides institutions within states and different fields of 
research. At the same time this division is not as simplistic as a division between for 
example commercial versus non-beneficial organisations, as is often when environmental 
problems are discussed. The same arguments are being put forward by politicians as well 
as Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs); by anti-asylum groups as 
well as the media. 
In previous research different perspectives on climate change induced migration have 
been highlighted (see e.g. White, 2011; Piguet, et al., 2011). The perhaps most dominant 
perspectives have been named the maximalist/alarmist perspective and the 
minimalist/sceptical perspective. Recently, the link between climate change adaptation 
and migration has been included in the debate, resulting in a discussion regarding whether 
migration is best described as the failure of mitigation and adaptation actions or if it 
should be seen as an adaptation strategy. These different points of view propose 
contesting ways of addressing climate change induced migration. 
Although there is a disagreement on how the topic of climate change induced migration 
should be addressed, one thing that most actors seem to agree on is that this issue needs to 
be addressed (see for example IPCC, 2012; UNFCCC AWG-LCA, 2009, pp. 13, para 25; 
Foresight, 2011; IOM, 2009; Cruz, et al., 2007, p. 488; McLeman, 2011). More recently 
the topic of climate change induced migration was discussed under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its eighteenth Conference of 
the Parties (COP) in the context of the work programme on loss and damage. The 
discussion was also here divided and resulted in a decision to work further towards an 
international mechanism to regulate the adverse effects of climate change, including 
human displacement (UNFCCC; COP, 2012). 
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To be able to choose how to address a certain topic one arguably needs to get a better 
understanding of the options proposed, what information and views the different sides 
rely on and in what way they differ from each other. Therefore, this thesis sets out to 
come one step closer to understanding this division by analysing different perspectives on 
climate change induced migration through the application of the perspectives to a case of 
climate change induced migration.  
1.1 Aim and research questions 
Even though climate change induced migration is a contested topic, most debaters seem 
to agree on the relevance of addressing this issue. The results of this thesis will hopefully 
shed some more light on the differences and similarities between the contesting sides of 
the debate, including which aspects of the issue they bring forward and highlight. The aim 
is also to see which, if any, gaps in the policy recommendations proposed need to be 
filled in order to put together a comprehensive response to this issue. By analysing 
different perspectives on a case of climate change induced migration, the aim of this 
thesis is to point out not only the different arguments but also to reveal how different 
perspectives and their proposed policy recommendations could be externalised and what 
implications they would bring for an existing case of climate change induced migration.  
To meet the aim of the thesis the following research questions will be analysed: 
 What perspectives and main debates regarding climate change induced migration 
exist in the literature? 
 What policy recommendations on climate change induced migration do the 
different analysed perspectives propose? 
 What similarities and differences can be found between the perspectives regarding 
policy recommendations? 
 Can any gaps in the policy recommendations of the perspectives be identified? If 
yes, which issues remain to be addressed? 
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1.2 Method and materials  
Although quite a few comparisons between perspectives on climate change induced 
migration have been conducted in the past, the analyses have remained mainly theoretical 
in their approach. Contrarily, case studies of climate change induced migration carried out 
rarely reflect upon the social construction of climate change induced migration. This 
being said, even if a perspective is not specifically pointed out, it does not mean that an 
underlying perspective cannot be identified. 
Thus, previous studies have rarely, at least explicitly, applied perspectives of climate 
change induced migration on a case within the same field. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that more interdisciplinary analyses in the field of climate change induced 
migration are needed; taking into account different ways of understanding the issue as 
well as findings from empirical studies carried out (see e.g. White, 2011). A bibliometric 
exploration made by Findley and Geddes (2011) shows that the term ‘environmental 
refugees’ has been frequently used, in academics and especially within policy discourses. 
However, few in-depth studies have been carried out (Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 142). 
To fill the gaps identified in previous literature displayed above, the approach applied in 
the current work is to bring theory and reality together by analysing perspectives of 
climate change induced migration on an empirical case. The following sections describe 
more in detail the approaches, methods and materials used in the analysis and explain the 
reasons behind the choices made. 
1.2.1 Approach and methods 
The analysis in this work consists of three parts. First, a review of contemporary writings 
on climate change induced migration was carried out. The review focussed on identifying 
main themes, including overall similarities and differences. Thereby the most dominant 
perspectives on climate change induced migration were identified. After singling out the 
main debates and perspectives, materials from the respective sides were collected and 
analysed, complemented with the result of previous analyses. This first part of the 
analysis, presented in chapter 2, displayed a debate between the maximalist/alarmist and 
the minimalist/sceptical perspectives. Nowadays, however, much of the debate is 
circulated around the linkages between climate change induced migration and adaptation 
to climate change. To include the most recent literature in the field I chose to build the 
analysis on a model
1
 constructed by Felli (2012) consisting of the two perspectives, the 
climate migrant and the climate refugee perspective. A discussion on the choice of 
analytical tool and methodological considerations is presented in section 2.6 in the current 
work. 
In the second part of the analysis, presented in chapter 3, empirical findings from a case 
of climate change induced migration, namely Bangladesh, were reviewed, categorised 
and summarised. Thus, for this work, the case of Bangladesh was used as an emblematic 
case of climate change induced migration. Including findings from a case of climate 
                                               
1
 Please see Annex 2 for the original model by Felli 
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change induced migration in the analysis aimed at visualising the differences and 
similarities and the implications of following one side or the other of the debate. 
Visualising the perspectives in this way, I argue, enabled the identification of aspects of 
climate change induced migration that might not have been easily identified only looking 
at empirical evidences. Bringing theory and empirical evidences together, I believe, 
facilitates taking a holistic approach to address the issue at stake.  
There are many reasons behind the choice of Bangladesh as a case of climate change 
induced migration. Bangladesh is often pointed out as highly prone to be affected by 
many different effects of climate change (see e.g. Kartiki, 2011; McLeman, 2011; 
Kniveton, et al., 2008). For example, Bangladesh has in previous literature been presented 
as “[…] a compelling if not urgent case in which environment-population mobility 
linkages may be studied, and addressed” (Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 146). 
Another reason is that I believe that the result from this specific case will be easier to 
generalise than for example from the case of small, low-lying islands. Although these 
islands are often pointed out as the main example of climate change induced migration, 
because of their low populations, more people are likely to be affected in other parts of 
the world (McNamara & Gibson, 2008; Kartiki, 2011; Biermann & Boas, 2010, p. 69; 
Docherty & Giannini, 2009, p. 356f). Furthermore, the case of small, low-lying islands is 
quite unique and might therefore need specific actions. Also, much recent literature on the 
topic indicates that climate change induced migration is likely to be internal (Kniveton, et 
al., 2008, p. 74f; Leighton, 2009, p. 330; Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 3; Walsham, 2010, p. 
28; Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 143). Following this indication Bangladesh comes out as 
a more relevant emblematic case than small island states, in this context.  
Thus, my aim was not to make a case study on Bangladesh specifically, but to use one 
case of climate change induced migration, to explore how perspectives on climate change 
induced migration could be manifested if applied on an existing case. Hence, the case 
should be seen as instrumental, an approach I chose as I believe it to be possible to make 
a deeper analysis using an existing case rather than a fictive one. 
In the third part of the analysis, presented in chapter 4, the findings from the empirical 
evidence from Bangladesh were categorised and inserted in the model used
2
, to identify 
and elaborate similarities and differences between the perspectives. It should be noted 
that the analysis was hence not about proving which perspectives are most ‘true’, or 
‘correct’, but to show how the perspectives differ and the practical and ethical 
consequences that follow from relying on one or the other perspective. This is an 
approach that can be recognised from discourse theory, and the role that discourse theory 
plays in this work is an aspect I find important to point out. 
Hajer defines discourses as: “[…] a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of 
practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 
1995, p. 44). Hajer’s definition displays how theories, as in ideas and concepts, transform 
into actions and explain phenomenon. Though I did not conduct a discourse analysis per 
se I used previously conducted discourse analyses as part of my materials. Furthermore, I 
                                               
2
 Please see appendix 4 to the current work for the full categorisation of the findings presented in chapter 3 
into Felli’s model of the climate refugee and the climate migrant perspectives. 
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categorised empirical findings and explained them through the use of perspectives on 
climate change induced migration, an approach that is similar to how Hajer’s definition of 
how discourses and realities are linked together. I also compare contesting debates, an 
approach common within discourse analysis and related to an understanding of power-
relations (Bergström & Boréus, 2005, p. 328). A general approach for discourse analyses, 
according to Bergström’s and Boréus’ description, is to see power as turning a certain 
understanding into the ‘truth’. Our understanding is in turn shaped by how we interpret 
information given. The aim for politics is to shape opinions and discourses are here seen 
as a struggle for getting the opinion for the view that the discourse proclaims (Bergström 
& Boréus, 2005, p. 327f). Discourses are thus important not if they are correct or not but 
to what extent they are able to shape the public opinion and thereby politics. As I have 
already stated, climate change induced migration is a contested topic. One of the main 
struggles within the field and that I studied but also encountered can be simply expressed 
by asking: Why is it so hard to agree on this issue? Why is there still no agreed upon 
definition and why is this topic so controversial? Here, discourse theory gives an answer: 
Because we see the world through different lenses and there is therefore no ‘true’ or 
‘best’ way to address an issue. Policies are hereby seen as normative. In this line, the aim 
of this thesis is not to determine which approach is the best but rather to see what happens 
when one perspective or another is applied to the issue. 
The importance of discourses for politics I find is explained in a good way by Hay, who 
writes that when information gaps exist, we have to rely on interpretations (2002, p. 209). 
Often within politics this is done through the use of broader paradigms. The problem is 
that when seeing the world through a lens, not all available options are clear or even 
available to us: “How actors behave – the strategies they consider in the first place, the 
strategies they discount, the strategies they deploy in the final instance and the politics 
they formulate – reflect their understanding of the context in which they find themselves. 
Moreover, that understanding may eliminate a whole range of realistic alternatives and 
may, in fact, prove in time to have been informed by a misrepresentation of the context in 
question” (Hay, 2002, p. 211). 
Hence, by constructing our understanding of a certain issue, discourses are important as 
they, so to speak, provide the space available to take policy decisions. Therefore, looking 
at discourses is an important tool to use in analysing debates. Or as Bingham puts it: 
“Discourse analysis is becoming a common tool in the field of environmental policy due 
to the recognition that different articulations of environmental problems and their 
solutions directly affect practice in terms of institution-building, policy-making and 
environmental problem-solving” (2010, p. 5). 
Seeing discourses in this broad context as in providing the space for policy decisions and 
shaping our society is also reflected in my choice of terminology. The different sides of 
the debate have been called ‘discourses’, ‘perspectives’, ‘takes on’ or ‘views on’. As will 
be further discussed in section 2.6 in the current work, the different views are not easily 
separated into clear discourses and when also seeing discourses as something that is not 
only expressed in the language used, but also in how our society is shaped, it becomes 
even more challenging to categorise arguments into well-defined discourses. I therefore 
find it reasonable to call the sides of the debate by the more vague term ‘perspectives’ 
rather than ‘discourses’.  
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In short, discourse theory partly forms the approach of the current work. As the approach 
per se includes interpretations, I find it important to display how the analyses were 
conducted in a transparent way. I have therefore included the models used and the 
categorisations made in the appendixes to this thesis. 
During the autumn of 2012 I did an internship with the UNFCCC Secretariat and also 
participated in the latest, yearly Conference of the Parties (COP) under the convention, 
held in Doha, Qatar, 2012. The experiences gave me valuable information and also 
formed my view on the topic. I believe that my personal experience of the issue enabled 
me to conduct a more in-depth analysis. However, witnessing international climate 
change negotiations from ‘the inside’ shaped my understanding of the topic and thus also 
affected the way I approached and used materials. To increase transparency, I think it is 
important to highlight this approach and would again like to refer to the appendixes for 
further insight in how the analysis was conducted and how materials were used.  
1.2.2 Choice of literature 
For choosing relevant materials and themes for the first part of the analysis, a review of 
how climate change induced migration emerged as a concept, was conducted. The review 
comprised of recent academic literature available to see which topics are, and have been, 
the most discussed in order to single out the most prominent perspectives
3
. First, 
background information was collected using recent meta-analyses such as the work edited 
by Piguet, Pécoud and de Guchteneire from 2011 and the work by White, also published 
in 2011. Second, additional literature was used to fill gaps.  
Materials used for the second part of the analysis consisted of available published studies 
on climate change induced migration in Bangladesh, including articles published in 
academic journals as well as official reports from major international and transnational 
organisations dating back five years in time which provides an updated view of the issue.
4
 
The literature was in some cases complemented with additional references found in the 
selected literature. The aim was to get a comprehensive and varied evidence-based 
overview of the state of the relevant empirical research carried out within the field. 
Literature on climate change induced migration in the case of Bangladesh was selected 
using keyword searches within databases including scientific journals, books and articles, 
and words within titles using Google Scholar and Google to find the material providing 
the foundation for the analysis. In this way, both scientific and materials produced from 
organisations were selected. Keywords used include: Bangladesh, migration, climate 
change or environment. 
The literature review sought references for the case of climate change induced migration 
chosen, i.e. Bangladesh. The lack of sources in languages other than English is a gap in 
the review. Other keywords could have been chosen, such as ‘global warming’. However, 
the meta-analyses reviewed overall referred to ‘climate change’ or ’environment’. Also, 
the use by intergovernmental or international organisations such as the United Nations 
                                               
3
 An overview of the literature review is presented in chapter two, where the background of the concept of 
climate change induced migration is presented. 
4
 Please see Annex 1 for the complete list. 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC, and the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, IPCC, of the term ‘climate change’ implies that this term is the most 
commonly accepted. Therefore, the materials were limited to references to the terms 
‘climate change’ and/or ‘environment’.   
It should thus be noted that, due to the gaps in the literature review pointed out above 
other impacts and effects may exist. However, as the literature sought to find the most 
recently produced documents, I believe that it provided sufficient materials to conduct the 
analysis. Starting from this review, future studies can then fill gaps and complement the 
results from this study.  
1.3 Terminology used 
There are many definitions describing people having to relocate due to climate change 
impacts
5
. The main term used in the current work – when not referring to definitions used 
in previous literature – is climate change induced migration, hereafter also referred to as 
CCIM. 
The use of ‘climate change’ instead of ‘environment’ limits the topic to climate change 
and not environmental issues and/or natural disasters in general. However, as no 
commonly recognised definition exists, materials used were not limited to only previous 
works using the term climate change. I, however, have focused on effects from climate 
change, and the conclusions drawn from this work should be seen as in the context of 
climate change impacts, though some probably could be generalised to environmental 
changes in general. 
Contrarily, the use of ‘migrants’ instead of ‘refugees’ was chosen as a way to broaden the 
survey and to look at the issue from more angles than if the narrower term ‘refugees’ 
would have been picked. Additionally, talking about migration instead of refugees is 
more general and less politically sensitive.  
Though one of the perspectives analysed in the current work uses the term ‘migrant’, it 
should be stressed that the aim of this thesis is not to take side for one or the other 
perspective. As pointed out above, the choice of the term ‘migrants’ was taken based on 
the practical implications of the term. 
  
                                               
5
 Please see section 2.1.1 for a more detailed review of the definitions and their implications 
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1.4 Disposition 
The following chapter gives a brief overview of the literature review, starting with a 
description of the birth of CCIM as a concept followed by a presentation of the most 
frequently discussed topics and its different sides and arguments. The chapter also covers 
a presentation of the most dominating perspectives, resulting in a choice of perspectives 
to use for the analysis as well as the choice of analytical tool. Next, chapter 3 describes 
the findings from a case of climate change migration, namely Bangladesh, resulting in an 
identification of different projected scenarios, using data from empirical studies. Chapter 
4 brings theory and empirical findings together, identifying differences and similarities of 
the contesting perspectives and trying to show how the projected scenarios would be 
addressed according to the different perspectives, including an identification of possible 
gaps in the policy recommendations. The results of the analysis are presented 
progressively throughout and then summarised. The last chapter, chapter 5, includes a 
summary of the findings and conclusions of the analysis.   
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2. What is Climate change induced 
migration? 
As already argued, CCIM is a contested topic. This chapter will start by giving a brief 
background on the concept, specifically pointing out debates and perspectives within the 
field. First, broader definitions and perspectives will be highlighted. Next, an elaboration 
of different views on the nature of CCIM will be presented followed by a look into what 
has been argued to cause the phenomenon as well as its consequences. Then there will 
follow an overview of different proposals on how to address the issue at stake. After 
pointing out specific arguments within the debate the choice of analytical tool will be 
presented and discussed. 
2.1 Definitions of and perspectives on climate change 
induced migration 
Though the issue of CCIM has been discussed for already quite some time, still no 
common agreed upon definition exists. One could perhaps think that it does not matter 
what definition one uses, the issue and its implications stay the same. However, the 
definition used also reflexes issues such as what one believes is causing the issue and the 
best way of addressing it. Therefore, this chapter now looks deeper into the debate 
regarding which definition to use and perspectives on CCIM.  
2.1.1 Refugees, displaced people or migrants? The definition-debate 
Literature within the field refers to a paper written by the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) in 1985 (El-Hinnawi, 1985) as the first time climate change induced 
migration was discussed (Morrissey, 2009, p. 3; White, 2011, p. 21; Docherty & 
Giannini, 2009, p. 363; Salauddin & Ashikuzzaman, 2012, p. 55). However, the term 
used was ‘environmental refugees’ - not ‘climate refugees’. According to McNamara and 
Gibson climate change entered the picture with a publication by the Worldwatch institute 
in 1988 (Jacobson, 1988). (McNamara & Gibson, 2008, p. 477) Not until the 1990s was 
the term used frequently and its use increased significantly between 1990 and 2009 
(Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 140). 
Still, however, people who are forced to migrate because of environmental changes have 
no formal protection under international law (McAdam, 2011b, p. 3; Docherty & 
Giannini, 2009, pp. 357, 363). To address this gap it has been discussed whether the 
current protection of refugees, The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees of 1951 (also referred to as the Geneva Convention), could and should provide 
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protection for ‘climate refugees’. Below, a brief comparison of different proposed 
definitions of environmental/climate refugees and the current definition of refugees from 
the Geneva Convention will follow. It should however be noted that neither Biermann 
and Boas nor Docherty and Giannini, presented below, argue that climate refugees should 
be included under the Geneva Convention, but rather under a new regime (a topic 
discussed in section 2.5). 
Norman Myers defines environmental refugees as “[…] people who can no longer gain a 
secure livelihood in their homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, 
deforestation and other environmental problems, together with the associated problems 
of population pressures and profound poverty. In their desperation, these people feel they 
have no alternative but to seek sanctuary elsewhere, however hazardous the attempt.” 
(2002, p. 609).  
In the purpose of providing protection for climate refugees under the UNFCCC, 
Biermann and Boas elaborated an own definition of climate refugees as: “[…] people who 
have to leave their habitats immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or 
gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of 
climate change: sea-level rise, extreme weather events and drought and water scarcity” 
(2010, p. 67). Compared to Myers, Biermann and Boas use a narrower definition, 
pointing out impacts related to three specific issues due to climate change. Perhaps the 
difference can be explained in relation to the time of the publication of the definitions, 
climate change entered the migration scene, as stated above, later than environmental 
change. Similarly, however, both Myers and Biermann and Boas use the term ‘refugees’, 
not ‘migrants’. Biermann and Boas argue that by using the term the need for protection is 
highlighted as well as the importance of the issue (2010, p. 67).  
Docherty and Giannini provide another definition of climate refugees as “[…] people 
whom climate change forces to relocate across national borders” (2009, p. 350). The 
definition thus differs from Biermann and Boas definition by excluding internally 
displaced people (IDPs) but including all kinds of climate change impacts.  
Excluding IDPs is, according to Docherty and Giannini, a way to recognise state 
sovereignty and also in line with the existing refugee regime, which they argue is more 
practical and more likely to be accepted. To limit the refugees to people who have no 
other choice than to cross a border to find safer ground, the definition includes that the 
movement has to be forced. Furthermore, the definition, Docherty and Giannini argue, 
take into consideration future scientific advancements making it possible to separate 
climate change impacts from natural changes (2009, pp. 368-371). 
Except for the change with the 1967 protocol that extended the possibility of seeking 
refugee status due to events also after January 1
st
 1951 (UNHCR, 2011, p. 46), the 
original definition of refugees in the Geneva Convention still stands, including people 
“[…] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
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or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 2011, pp. 14, Articel 1, 
para, A2 of the Convention).  
Compared to the different definitions of climate/environmental refugees above the 
Geneva Convention does, in line with Docherty and Giannini, only protect cross-border 
refugees. It has been argued that excluding climate change induced IDPs from protection 
is problematic as most migration due to climate change impacts has been pointed out as 
likely to be internal (Brown, 2007, p. 7; McAdam, 2011b, p. 17). Furthermore, refugees 
are protected under the Convention if the refugee is being, or at risk of being, ‘persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion’, but, as Warner argue, the cause for seeking refuge from climate change 
is in general not persecution (2010, p. 404). It could perhaps be argued that Myers’ 
definition of environmental refugees does include persecution as the reasons listed are 
related to ‘population pressure and profound poverty’, actions that the government 
arguably have lacked in addressing. However, these reasons are not mentioned as reasons 
for seeking protection under the Geneva Convention and in the case of climate change 
impacts it could also be argued that governments lack of addressing poverty and 
population pressure can rather be linked to a lack of resources. This is in line with the 
view, highlighted by Piguet, Pécoud and Guchteneire, that while the industrialised states 
are mostly responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, it is the poorest people on the earth 
who suffer from its effects and thus are industrialised states responsible to assist 
developing countries in addressing CCIM (2011, p. 20). Defining climate change impacts 
as the reason for seeking refuge puts, in a way, the responsibility for causing the harm on 
many actors - the polluters, in contrast to the current refugee regime which puts the 
responsibility on one actor - the state.  
A possible similarity between the Convention and the definition above is the way that 
affected people are forced to, or cannot return to their homelands. Myers writes that 
‘people feel they have no alternative’, Biermann and Boas include ‘people who have to 
leave’ and Docherty’s and Giannini’s refugees are ‘people who climate change forces to 
relocate’. However, in previous literature it has been argued that migration due to climate 
change is different than traditional refugeehood, as CCIM generally does not apply to 
people who need protection from their governments - quite the contrary they are still 
under the protection of their governments. It has further been argued that the debate does 
not take into account how affected populations want to be treated and that most people do 
not wish to leave their homes (See e.g. McAdam, 2011a; Oels, 2009, p. 18). 
Furthermore, some critics to the use of the protection of climate change migrants by 
providing refugeehood and moving people to safer ground argue that the approach is too 
simplistic. CCIM is not just about migrating; it is also a question of equality and of 
addressing cultural losses. The critics mean that the question is rather about human rights 
than about refugeehood (McNamara & Gibson, 2008, p. 481; Farbatko & Lazrus, 2012, p. 
383). It has also been argued that protecting ‘climate refugees’ under international law 
risks taking away the responsibility of developed countries to provide assistance to 
developing countries affected by climate change impacts, as long as they provide 
habitations for the refugees (McNamara & Gibson, 2008, p. 482). In this vein White 
stresses that an inclusion of climate refugees under the 1951 Convention could undermine 
the protection of people who traditionally are counted as refugees (2011, p. 23). More 
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generally it has been argued that as the current refugee regime, the Geneva Convention, 
does not provide protection to people fleeing from climate change impacts, the use of the 
term ’climate refugees’, wrongly implies that these people would already be protected by 
the Convention (Warner, 2010, p. 404; IOM, 2009, p. 4f).  
It has further been argued that even if the Convention would be extended, existing 
institutional arrangements would not be able to handle this change (Warner, 2010, p. 404; 
IOM, 2009, p. 4f). Brown claims that only in cases of extreme weather events some 
assistance could be given, but then in the shape of humanitarian aid and preventive 
actions such as early warning systems (2007, p. 25).  
Not only institutional capacity seems to be lacking, also political will. For example, 
Findley and Geddes argue that “[t]here is certainly no evidence of any sympathy for the 
view that the International Convention on Refugees should be changed to accommodate 
environmentally linked migration” (2011, p. 144). Instead would, the writers argue, 
developed countries be more willing to finance adaptation of vulnerable areas.   
It has been argued that the term ‘climate refugees’ was first used to put climate change on 
the international political agenda (McNamara & Gibson, 2008, p. 477), by humanitarian 
groups claiming “climate justice”, but also by the anti-asylum lobby who argues that 
increased border security is needed to respond to the predicted invasions of migrants from 
poor countries (Morrissey, 2009, p. 8f). 
Linking environmental change to conflicts has, according to White (2011), been used in 
the same vein: To make environmental problems a top-priority for governments, in the 
hope of getting more attention to environmental problems from stakeholders as well as 
the public. On the other hand, White argues, framing something as a security issue can 
negatively lead to a stronger state involvement and a step away from involving actors at 
the local level (2011, pp. 63-65). In line with White, Hartmann (2010) argues that some 
of the literature regarding CCIM and conflicts can be associated with an attempt to raise 
awareness of the issue and to make western states take responsibility, mobilising the fear 
of industrialised states to be over-flooded by refugees. However, this is, Hartmann argues, 
a counterproductive method: “Playing with fear is like playing with fire. You cannot be 
sure exactly where it will spread” (2010, p. 239).  
In the opposite side from the ‘climate refugee’ definitions, IOM has elaborated a more 
inclusive definition, defining environmental migrants as “[...] persons or groups of 
persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the 
environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave 
their homes or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either 
within their country or abroad” (2009, p. 5). Here it can be noted that IOM’s definition 
includes groups or individuals, migrating due to slow or onset events, in a forced or 
voluntary manner, resulting in permanent or temporal migration.  
Arguably in a nexus between IOMs definition and the ‘environmental/climate refugee’ 
definitions presented above, Williams (2008) proposes a definition of climate refugees on 
a gradual scale, reaching from acute refugee status to chronic displacement, and 
everything in between. Accordingly, protection should be provided on a sliding scale. 
This way the complex nature of CCIM is recognised, as well as the necessity to address 
not only displacement, but also the causes of displacement (2008, p. 522f). 
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Previous literature shows that while CCIM might have started by defining different types 
of refugees, a variety of definitions have been proposed. The contesting definitions could 
arguably be linked back to the view on the role of adaptation actions. According to Felli, 
while the term ‘climate refugees’ has been used to point out the failure of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation policies, the use of the term ‘climate migrants’ has been mostly 
used to signal migration as an adaptation strategy (2012, pp. 4f). The point of view taken 
in this discussion arguably also impacts other factors of the definition used. If migration 
is seen as an adaptation strategy then the movement is voluntary. On the contrary, if 
migration is seen as the failure to adapt, then the definition used would more likely be 
‘refugees’ or ‘displaced people’, as the action is forced.  
Hence, the definition chosen also displays other points of view and unveils other 
questions such as: Who should be protected? What changes in the environment have to 
appear for protection? Should only cross-border migrants be included or also internally 
displaced people? The side taken on these questions can further be associated with 
different perspectives on CCIM – the topic for the next section. 
2.1.2 The beginning of the end or a never-ending story? Perspectives on climate 
change induced migration 
As stated above, it has been argued that climate refugees were put on the agenda to draw 
attention to climate change. Such reasoning can arguably be linked to the so called 
alarmist or maximalist perspective. Gemenne (2011) describes the perspective as 
typically painting out dramatic images of what could happen if nothing is done to address 
this upcoming crisis, including violent conflicts. The perspective soon got its opponents, 
writing within a perspective called the sceptical or the minimalist (Gemenne, 2011, p. 
230). 
Morrissey, writing for the IOM, points out Myers, along with environmental and 
humanitarian non-governmental ‘climate justice’ organisations such as Christian Aid, as 
the main spokesmen for the maximalist school (2009, p. 8, see also Oels 2011, p. 2). 
Myers drew a link between CCIM and violent conflicts and estimated large numbers of 
future climate refugees, numbers cited in prominent works such as the Stern Review on 
the Economics of Climate Change (see e.g. Stern, 2006, p. 77). 
Contrastingly, Suhrke (1993) uses contemporary examples of effects of environmental 
degradation on migration patterns to show that the relationship is not as simplistic as the 
maximalists suggests. According to Suhrke the maximalists “[…] tend to extract the 
environmental variable from a cluster of causes and proclaim the associated out-
migration as a direct result of environmental degradation.” (1993, p. 6), while “[t]he 
minimalists focus on the impact of a particular process such as land degradation or 
changing climate in migration” (Suhrke, 1993, p. 5). 
Within the maximalist/alarmist perspective the relationship between climate change and 
migration has generally been seen as linear with changes in the environment leading to 
future large-scale migration. The minimalist/sceptical perspective instead looks at current 
migration patterns and their complex nature, and thereby stressing multi-causality and a 
- 14 - 
 
non-linear relationship (for an overview see e.g. Morrissey, 2009, p. 18f; Gemenne, 2011, 
p. 230). 
According to Morrissey (2009), despite attempts to use a more holistic approach to the 
link between climate/environmental change and migration, the field became more and 
more polarised during the late nineties. Morrissey points out Norman Myers, 
continuously publishing alarming figures of the number of expected climate refugees as 
the front figure for the maximalist school, and Richard Black on the other side, writing 
within the minimalist school (Morrissey 2009, p. 7). 
Black (2001) questions the underlying agenda of the alarmists and argues that separating 
environmental refugees from other refugees could undermine the chances of getting 
asylum, as one of the reasons for seeking asylum is indeed environmental change. In this 
line, after conducting a literature review of different types of environmental migration, 
Black finds little proof for the big numbers of migrants predicted by the Maximalist 
School (2001, p. 10f). One of the major concerns of Black seems to be the methods 
employed, as Black states that “[…] the strength of the academic case is often 
depressingly weak” (2001, p. 2). Black argues that defining environmental refugees from 
other refugees is close to impossible, as migration is such a complex phenomenon. As 
estimates of the expected number of environmental refugees needs a definition of 
environmental refugees, such an attempt is also very problematic (Black, 2001, p. 3). 
McNamara criticises the maximalist school for being simplistic and not taking into 
account other factors. However, she also criticises the minimalists for providing a view of 
CCIM as non-existent, though the aim might have been to point out that other factors also 
contributes to migration. McNamara argues that the critiques from the minimalist 
perspective “[…] have had the effect (whether intentional or not) of contesting and 
dismissing the phenomenon of environmental refugees altogether” (McNamara, 2007, p. 
14).  
Morrissey argues that the dominance of the maximalist perspective started to lose ground 
within academic writings after the strong critics (2009, p. 5). However, he also points out 
that the maximalist perspective is still winning a lot of interest, especially from different 
humanitarian organisations as well as within popular literature (Morrissey, 2009, p. 11). 
More recently, attention has been given to another debate, namely whether migration is 
best explained as the failure of mitigation and adaptation, or as an adaptation strategy. 
2.1.3 A change in the debate? The migration and climate change adaptation 
nexus 
As shown in the section above, a clash between mainly two sides, the maximalist/alarmist 
perspective and the minimalist/sceptical perspective, has been identified. More recently, 
also a debate regarding the link between climate change adaptation and migration has 
emerged. For example, Piguet, Pécoud and de Guchteneire point out that the view on the 
link between adaptation and migration is a contested topic, as migration can be seen 
either as an adaptation strategy, or as an indication of the failure to adapt to climate 
change (Piguet, et al., 2011, p. 15). 
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According to Felli (2012), the perspective of migration as an adaptation strategy is recent, 
and its use can, on the level of international organisations, be traced back to 2007 and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Thereafter it has also been used by e.g. 
the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the United Nations University 
Institute (UNU) and the World Bank (Felli 2012, pp. 5-7). Findley and Geddes write that 
“IOM researchers have been particularly eager to consider migration as one of a range 
of adaptation strategies for populations facing environmental change, rather than 
portraying mobility as a negative outcome and evidence of a failure to adapt” (2011, p. 
143). In this line, Morrissey (2009) argues that there has been a turn away from the 
alarmist perspective within academic writing. Morrissey points out that the IOM has 
turned to point out a more complex system and how the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate change (IPCC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) have adjusted their tones from a more alarmist one to respond and adjust 
according to the minimalist school (Morrissey 2009, pp. 12f). A change in rhetoric by the 
IPCC is also pointed out by Bettini (2012) who analyses writings by the IPCC and others, 
inspired by poststructuralist discourse theory. Bettini identifies and analyses four different 
discourse families labelled capitalist, humanitarian, scientific and radical climate change 
discourses within the climate-migration nexus. Identifying the IPCC within the scientific 
family, Bettini finds that the IPCC has turned from using an exploratory to a more 
cautious tone within the debate (2012 pp. 3f). This tone differentiates from the other three 
discourses, which instead use “[...] strong and dramatic tones” (Bettini 2012, p. 4).  
Felli uses a Marxist political economy perspective for arguing that the shift in the debate, 
from one claiming that migration caused by climate change is the result of the failure of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation to one arguing that migration should be seen as 
a strategy of adaptation to climate change, “[…] is related to broader transformations in 
climate, migration and development policies and follows the nature of neoliberal 
capitalism in that it produces and reproduces ‘primitive accumulations’.” (2012, p. 3). 
Felli identifies and labels two perspectives, the climate migrant perspective that sees 
migration as an adaptation strategy, and the climate refugee perspective that sees 
migration as the failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Both perspectives 
are normative and used to highlight different sides of the debate. 
As an ideal type, key features for the climate migrant perspective includes, according to 
Felli (2012, p. 9), a view of migration as voluntary and as a part of human history. 
Migration can according to this view be managed and if managed lead to positive 
outcomes such as financial resources and knowledge transfer. Furthermore, migration is 
caused by vulnerabilities, in the environment and among populations, and addressing 
migration therefore includes capacity building in vulnerable areas and actions to increase 
resilience.  Climate migrants should, according to Felli’s description of the climate 
migrant perspective, be protected under soft laws and through the inclusion of climate 
migrants under the protection of domestic policies, as well as through policy diffusion. 
However, if left unmanaged migration can lead to environmental degradation, violence 
and disruptions (Felli 2012, p. 9).  
On the other side of the spectra, as an ideal type, Felli (2012, p. 9) describes the climate 
refugee perspective as seeing migration as involuntary. CCIM should according to this 
view be addressed by further efforts on mitigation, as well as actions to repair losses and 
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damages associated with the adverse effects of climate change. It is further argued that if 
no actions are taken, climate change will lead to migration and consequently to 
degradation of the environment in the area to where climate refugees move. The climate 
refugee perspective, according to Felli’s description, seeks recognition under international 
law, in the shape of for example a new international treaty, and the overall responsibility 
lies within the industrialised states. Climate migrants are typically portrayed by islands 
vanishing into the ocean, or as a ‘barbarian invasion’ to western countries (Felli, 2012, p. 
9). 
2.2 Different types of climate change induced migration 
This section tries to shed some light on the current characteristics of CCIM and what will 
characterise it in the future. One of the main clashes in the debate regarding the nature of 
CCIM has been whether climate change impacts will lead to large scale cross-border 
migration or if migration will be mainly internal. Another important discussion has been 
whether CCIM will be mainly voluntary or forced.  
Using estimations of population pressure, people living in absolute poverty and how 
many people that are likely to live in areas with increased environmental pressure, Myers 
estimates that the number of environmental refugees will increase significantly, with up 
to 200 millions of people having to relocate as a result of climate change impacts by the 
year 2050, some of them internally but still with slim chances of ever returning (2002, p. 
610f). 
Critiques of Myers’ and other maximalist writers’ way of dealing with environmental 
refugees argue that estimating large numbers of potential climate refugees puts an 
unnecessarily apocalyptic tone on migration related to climate change (Morrissey, 2009, 
p. 4). For example, Suhrke (1993) argues that the broad categorisations to define 
environmental refugees and environmental degradation of the maximalist school 
automatically result in a prediction of large numbers of future refugees. The problem with 
such studies is, according to Suhrke that, the categorisations are too broad to be useful. 
Furthermore, alarmist thinking risks frightening the public and give fuel to anti-immigrant 
voices. Researchers instead need to include the broader perspective of development 
processes into the analysis (1993, p. 6f). 
White argues that the first literature concerning climate change and migration tended to 
present an image of millions of refugees trying to cross the borders to the north Atlantic 
states (2011, p. 47). However, Piguet, Pécoud and de Guchteneire argue that nowadays 
most researchers have moved away from this apocalyptical view on CCIM (2011, p. 5). 
Several studies point out that based on patterns of existing migration and empirical 
findings, migration as a result of climate change is most likely to be short-distance and 
internal (Kniveton, et al., 2008, p. 74f; Leighton, 2009, p. 330; Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 
3; Walsham, 2010, p. 28; Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 143). These findings go against 
some of the first and widely cited publications regarding CCIM indicating that climate 
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change impacts risks causing international mass-migration (Piguet, et al., 2011, p. 5; 
White, 2011, p. 47). 
More specifically, the findings from the fieldwork by Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011) 
suggest that slow-onset environmental changes, namely salination of groundwater, soil 
erosion, draught and desertification increases the likelihood of local migration but 
decreases the likelihood of international migration. One of the explanations given behind 
this result is that international migration requires time-consuming preparations and with 
an increase in the time needed to collect necessary livelihood, people have less time for 
such preparations. This indicates, according to Bohra-Mishra and Massey, that the image 
of climate refugees as masses of international migrants trying to get over another state’s 
borders is exaggerated (2011, p. 98f). 
In this line, McLeman and Hunter (2010) argue that the size of this migration is 
dependent on the strength of adaptation measures taken. Also non-migration patterns 
should be taken into consideration in order to take prompt policy decisions.  The authors 
argue that it is important to learn from empirical studies in order to eliminate “[…] much 
of the still-remaining guess work on how climate change-related migration will unfold” 
(McLeman & Hunter, 2010, p. 458). Furthermore, following the argument that it is the 
social-economic situation that ultimately decides the extent of migration and the view of 
the relationship as non-linear, it has been claimed impossible to calculate the likely 
number of future climate migrants, as the number is dependent on processes related to 
underlying mechanisms, as well as what and if actions are taken today (see e.g. Piguet, et 
al., 2011, p. 25; Foresight, 2011, p. 31; Warner, 2010, p. 403; Brown, 2007, p. 17). 
According to Morrissey, researchers within the field of CCIM have put much effort into 
trying to differentiate between forced and voluntary migration due to changes in the 
environment (2009, p. 4f). In this vein, one key approach has been to distinguish 
environmental refugees from voluntary migrants by looking at the extent to which 
relocation occurs in advance or as a direct effect of an environmental problem of some 
kind (Morrissey, 2009, p. 8). However, in previous literature the difficulty of separating 
different types of migration has also been stressed. For example, short-term migration can 
turn into long-term migration if things do not turn out as hoped, making it hard to 
distinguish between forced and voluntary migration (Piguet, et al., 2011, p. 15f). To get a 
deeper understanding of the difficulty to distinguish and to explain CCIM, the next 
section will look further into its causes and underlying mechanisms. 
2.3 Causes and underlying mechanisms of climate change 
induced migration 
Discussions regarding causes and underlying mechanisms of CCIM include to what 
extent migration as the result of changes in the environment can be attributed to climate 
change, and thus anthropogenic, and to what extent changes are ‘natural’ in the sense that 
they would have occurred also without anthropogenic forces. Furthermore, even if 
anthropogenic climate change causes migration, is it possible to distinguish CCIM from 
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migration due to other impacts? Also, the debate seems torn between highlighting climate 
change as the main cause and vulnerability or lack of resilience among affected 
populations as the main cause. These discussions will be displayed in this section. 
In previous literature it has been stressed that people have in all times migrated because 
of changes in the environment and the way in which environmental problems affect 
migration patterns has long been discussed (Piguet, et al., 2011, p. 3f; Morrissey, 2009, p. 
8; Warner, 2010, p. 402). 
The discussion regarding how climate change can result in migration was in turn born 
from the research on how changes in the environment in general affect human mobility 
(Piguet, et al., 2011, p. 3f; Morrissey, 2009, p. 8; Farbatko & Lazrus, 2012, p. 384). 
However, it has been argued that the debate around CCIM often does not pay enough 
attention to how environmental changes in general affect human migration (Morrissey, 
2009, p. 11; Brown, 2007, pp. 14-16; McAdam, 2011a, p. 2; Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 
145). Hence, if the link between environmental problems and migration has much in 
common with how climate change impacts affect human mobility, much can be learned 
regarding CCIM from the environmental change and migration nexus. However, in the 
literature regarding CCIM, some features being specific for this field of research have 
been accentuated. 
For example, Piguet, Pécoud and de Guchteneire (2011) point out that although 
environmental impacts and climate change impacts often tend to lead to the same effects 
on human migration patterns, there is an important difference between the causes. The 
difference, according to the authors, is that while victims from a natural disaster, such as 
an earthquake, suffer from a nature-made phenomenon, people affected by the impacts of 
climate change suffer from the effects of anthropogenic activity (Piguet, et al., 2011, p. 
19). Though both phenomena risk displacing people, only one is man-mad and someone 
can thus be blamed for the impacts. This also reflects on proposals on how to address 
CCIM, a topic that will be further elaborated in part 2.5 below. 
There is also, according to White (2011), a difference between climate change impacts 
and other man-made environmental problems. While individuals who have to relocate due 
to for example depleted environments as a strategy in war or because of dam building, 
CCIM is caused by human actions and not the result of one policy decision as in the other 
examples (White, 2011, p. 25). Hence, in the case of climate change, the cause of 
migration/displacement as well as the actor causing the problem is more diffuse and 
difficult to identify. 
Nevertheless, studies on CCIM points to that climate change will become an increasingly 
more important trigger for migration (McLeman, 2011, p. 24; Piguet, et al., 2011, p. 25; 
Foresight, 2011, p. 9; IOM, 2009, p. 1; Docherty & Giannini, 2009, p. 349). 
IPCC’s special report on extreme events (2012) indicates (with medium agreement and 
medium evidence) that disasters associated with climate extremes have an impact on 
population mobility and relocation. Furthermore, would these disasters become more 
intense and/or occur more frequently some areas will provide fewer resources resulting in 
decreased possibility for maintaining livelihood. According to the authors, this could in 
turn result in more permanent migration, resulting in higher pressure on the areas of 
relocation (2012, p. 14). 
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Regarding temperature changes due to climate change, Rebetez (2011, p. 40) argues that 
an increase in extreme temperatures is the most likely to directly affect human migration. 
According to Rebetez, temperature changes are also likely to indirectly affect the human 
mobility through for example an increase in insects in some regions leading to an increase 
in cases of malaria and in turn to migration. Another example given is the combination of 
rising temperatures and air pollution leading to ozone formation in urban areas. Rebetez 
(2011, p. 42) work shows that effects of climate change on migration are often difficult to 
predict because of the complexity of the processes in the nature. For example, rising 
temperatures negatively affect water-security through the melting of glaciers. On the 
other hand, climate change also leads to an increase in rain, leading to well-filled water 
reservoirs, which might make up for the disappearance of glaciers (Rebetez, 2011, p. 42). 
Generally, different climate change related impacts affect migration patterns in different 
ways. Climate change related hazards are sudden, while others appear gradually. In a 
simplistic way it can be said that sudden impacts such as floods result in temporary mass-
migration, while slow-onset events such as sea-level rise have more diffuse impacts on 
for example development and can result in more permanent resettlement (see e.g. 
Foresight, 2011, p. 81; Walsham, 2010, p. 3; Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 2; Findley & 
Geddes, 2011, p. 145; IOM, 2009, p. 3f). 
According to Morrissey (2011), a methodological concern especially important for 
writers within the maximalist school is the problems encountered with the uncertainties 
regarding the scale of climate change impacts, especially when it comes to so-called 
tipping points. Tipping points in this context refers to changes that occur quickly as a 
result of pushing the carrying-capacity of the nature as far as the nature can support the 
impact, resulting in an abrupt change. Such sudden change is believed to result in mass-
migration. Here, Morrissey argues, the literature is mostly hypothetical, as such non-
linear relationships are difficult to assess (2009, p. 13f). 
Asmita Naik discusses whether natural disasters can at all be seen as a cause of 
permanent migration, or if such an outcome rather is the result of government’s lack of 
resources to help the population (2009, p. 295f). 
In this line it has been argued that CCIM is closely linked to other factors such as social 
and economic vulnerability and the impact of environmental stresses or shocks and 
migration varies depending on socioeconomic as well as psychological factors of those 
affected (Piguet, et al., 2011, p. 17f; Kniveton, et al., 2008, p. 74f; IOM, 2009, p. 2). 
The EACH-FOR
6
 report identifies three causal factors resulting in different types of 
forces migration: conflicts, development policies and projects, and disasters. The report 
points out that: “Many observers note that forced migration is complex. The study of 
forced migration is multidisciplinary, international, and multisectoral, incorporating 
academic, practitioner, agency and local perspectives” (Jäger, et al., 2009, p. 9). 
Furthermore, though the poorest people might have the biggest incentives for migrating 
and seeking better opportunities elsewhere, they often lack the resources needed for 
migrating, especially in cases when environmental change leads to the destruction of the 
                                               
6
 The EACH-FOR project was a two year long research project based on case-studies, co-financed by the 
European Commission. The project ended in 2009. See <www.each-for.eu> for more information. 
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few resources they previously relied upon (Black, et al., 2011a, p. 449; Walsham, 2010, p. 
28; Warner, 2010, p. 410; Piguet, et al., 2011, p. 25; Foresight, 2011, p. 72; Brown, 2007, 
p. 2). 
Taking into account the complex link between migration and climate change it has been 
claimed close to impossible to single out climate change as the most important factor 
behind a decision to migrate (Piguet, et al., 2011, p. 15f). In this line, Findley and Geddes 
(2011, p. 139) argue that putting ‘climate’ or ‘environment’ together with ‘migrants’ or 
‘refugees’ all have the same problem – they imply that changes in the environment and/or 
the climate would be the main driver for migrants/refugees. The authors further argue that 
such a view is too simplistic and that the direct link between environmental/climatic 
changes and migration/refugeehood has little empirical ground (Findley & Geddes, 2011, 
p. 139). Black questions “[…] the value of international policy-makers focusing on 
‘environmental refugees’ as a significant group of migrants, deserving of the world’s 
attention” and argues, that identifying environmental change as the main reason for 
seeking refugeehood is misleading (2001, p. 1). 
2.4 Consequences of climate change induced migration 
The previous section presented different views on causes and underlying mechanisms of 
CCIM, but also displayed the difficulties in distinguishing causes of CCIM from 
environmental changes in general. The consequence of CCIM is yet another contested 
topic within the field, a topic that the current section will look further into. 
Myers (2002) argues that existing policy responses do not address this issue adequately 
and that a good starting point would be to recognise that environmental refugees exist at 
all. Myers describes the link between environmental change and migration as “[a]lthough 
it derives primarily from environmental problems, it generates problems of political, 
social and economic sorts. As such, it could readily become a cause of turmoil and 
confrontation, leading to conflicts and violence” (2002, p. 611). 
In a similar tone, McLeman writes that: “In short, the makings of a perfect storm are in 
place: human population numbers are growing in the very regions where the physical 
risks of climate change are most likely to undermine livelihoods and trigger migration, 
leading many to worry that this storm may be accompanied by political instability and 
violence in vulnerable regions” (2011, p. 24). This dramatic view of CCIM is far from 
uncontested and much of the recent literature employs another view: That climate change 
impacts not necessarily lead to migration and that when migration does occur, it can also 
have positive effects, effects that should be given support in addressing CCIM (Foresight, 
2011; IPCC, 2012; Piguet, et al., 2011; Kniveton, et al., 2008; Findley & Geddes, 2011). 
By arguing that climate change could lead to conflicts by causing mass-migration, climate 
change becomes a security issue (Morrissey, 2009, p. 8f). The debate whether climate 
change will cause conflicts or not can, with its proponents and opponents, also be 
separated into belonging to the maximalist and the minimalist perspectives, according to 
Morrissey (2009, p. 13f). 
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For example, different political scenes and arenas such as the United Nations Security 
Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been pointed out as 
driving the climate change and conflict perspective, where the findings from writers 
within the maximalist school, such as Myers, are often used to underpin arguments for 
addressing the security aspects of CCIM (Oels, 2012, pp. 2-6; White, 2011, p. 69ff). 
Betsy Hartmann criticises what she calls the climate conflict discourse by arguing that 
painting out climate refugees as a security threat is not an accurate way of addressing 
climate change and can harm development aid by militarising the issue (2010, p. 242). 
The way of picturing climate change as the major cause of migration is too simplistic and 
neglects that the effects of climate change also depend on the resilience of affected areas 
and adaptation measures taken, which in turn depend on socio-economic factors 
(Hartmann, 2010, p. 237f). 
In this line, White argues that emphasising climate related migration as a security threat 
results in developed countries putting resources into protecting themselves from a 
presumed threat and building thicker border protections, instead of using the resources to 
undertake mitigation and adaptation actions:  “What is clear is that while a security 
framework is politically successful, it takes away intellectual, political and financial 
capital from more fruitful and just policy measures” (2011, p. 144). Furthermore, putting 
a security framing on the issue means that the obligation of the state is to protect its 
citizens from this threat, and they would be “off the hook” from solving the underlying 
problems causing CCIM (White, 2011, p. 69). 
2.5 Addressing climate change induced migration 
Regarding how to address CCIM, several proposals have been given in previous 
literature. The main sides in this debate seem to be if CCIM should be regulated under 
international law, or if it is better to focus on soft laws and local adaptation as well as to 
facilitate the use of migration as an adaptation strategy. These suggestions, with their pros 
and cons, will be presented in this section. 
2.5.1 A new international treaty 
Biermann and Boas (2010) argue that ‘adapting away’ CCIM will only be possible in 
some cases. Especially poor countries will need assistance and support and ‘climate 
refugees’ are in need of support and protection. Therefore, the authors suggest the 
establishment of a new legal regime, “The Protocol on Recognition, Protection and 
Resettlement of Climate Change Refugees”, operating under the UNFCCC (Biermann & 
Boas, 2010, p. 61). In short, Biermann and Boas propose that the new protocol could be 
included under a broader adaptation protocol to ensure holistic adaptation actions and to 
combine adaptation with planned relocation programmes. However, the writers argue, it 
is important that such a protocol does not undermine the protection of those populations 
for whom adaptation is not an option (Biermann & Boas 2010, p. 78). The protocol 
should, according to the proposal, be placed under the authority of the COP and the 
UNFCCC could provide for an executive committee. The Committee would maintain a 
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list of areas under the protection (e.g. villages) of the protocol and its population would 
thereby be recognised as in need of relocation and should be given support for this 
(Biermann & Boas 2010, p. 77). Every party under the UNFCCC could accordingly 
propose new areas of inclusion that should then be decided by the COP. Key elements on 
an operational level to the new protocol would, according to Biermann’s and Boas’ 
suggestion, include a scientific body specialised on the issue, a network of assisting 
agencies coordinated by the UNFCCC secretariat as well as a new fund for this purpose 
under the authority of the COP (Biermann & Boas, 2010, pp. 77-82). 
Docherty and Giannini (2009, p. 350) argue that due to the possible large scale of CCIM, 
and also because of the anthropogenic nature of the problem, international efforts are, and 
should be, provided. The writers propose a new international legal instrument under a 
new international convention as they find the Geneva Convention too restrictive and the 
UNFCCC too focused on states rather than individuals at risk. This legal instrument aims 
at providing humanitarian aid and to provide protection of human rights for climate 
refugees. To fulfil this aim coordination between different actors is, according to 
Docherty and Giannini, essential, to make sure that home and host states as well as the 
international community assist in the work and to establish a body of scientific expertise 
within the field. Furthermore, the international community should provide refugees with 
humanitarian aid through “[g]lobal fund awards to intergovernmental or non-
governmental humanitarian organizations” (Docherty & Giannini, 2009, p. 384).  
Williams (2008) proposes an alternative to a new international agreement; regionally 
oriented regimes operating under an international umbrella framework, arguably the 
UNFCCC. Williams argues that taking into account the unwillingness for states to 
participate in international climate change regimes such as the Kyoto Protocol, it is 
unlikely that a new international agreement on climate refugees would be successful. 
Also, the current refugee regime only operates with cross-border refugees and not 
internally displaced people (IDPs), which is problematic in the case of climate refugees 
(Williams, 2008, p. 517). Williams argues that regional cooperation allows for adapting 
actions after regional context, further implement regional frameworks on IDPs and to 
exchange experiences through regional platforms – efforts that, in the long-run, could 
open up for international agreements (2008, pp. 520-522). While it would be up to the 
regions how the issue would be addressed, Williams proposes some minimum 
international agreements under a new post-Kyoto protocol: The recognition of climate 
refugees as a phenomenon and an encouragement to address the issue regionally (2008, p. 
520). 
2.5.2 Soft laws and migration as an adaptation strategy  
Several researchers have recently argued that the complex relationship between 
environmental changes and migration needs to be addressed holistically. Migration due to 
climate change is not necessarily negative, contrarily migration can bring positive effects 
for both sending as well as receiving areas and therefore migration can and should also be 
seen as an adaptive strategy to climate change (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010, p. 239; Black, et 
al., 2011a; Morrissey, 2009, p. 37). As migration can prove to be a good adaptation 
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strategy, it should therefore not be avoided in all cases (Kniveton, et al., 2008, p. 74f; 
Walsham, 2010, p. 4; White, 2011, p. 7). 
Warner (2010) argues that existing as well as new modes of governance with structures 
that address the new challenges that climate change poses on human mobility 
management will be needed to make society capable of managing environmentally 
induced migration. The current regime puts the main responsibility on international 
humanitarian organisations and national governments and focuses mainly on short-term 
disaster relief, not long-term guidance including the importance to consider the link 
between adaptation and migration that will be required (Warner, 2010, p. 410f). 
According to Warner, key features in governance structures appropriate for addressing 
human mobility linked to environmental change include international guiding principles 
for states to assist the implementation of policies to address environmentally induced 
migration and a focus on capacity building. In this vein, a platform for policy dialogue 
where governments can exchange information and best practices should be established 
(Warner, 2010, p. 411). Warner also proclaims practical assistance for climate change 
migrants, including help to integrate in the new area, protection from discrimination and 
assistance in finding new livelihood options (2010, p. 409). Warner argues that effective 
governance is the key to success. To Warner, effective governance in this sense means 
flexible governance to meet the challenges of this complex issue, including increased 
participation of those affected by environmental change and to use a holistic approach, 
including a combination of instruments proved effective in the past (2010, p. 411). 
In line with Warner, Brown (2007) points out gaps in existing legislation and also lacking 
political will to address the issue of forced migration due to climate change, “[t]here has 
been a collective, and rather successful, attempt to ignore the scale of the problem” 
(2007, p. 2). However, taking into consideration the reluctance of the international 
community to address the issue, Brown argues that it is unlikely that an extension of the 
Geneva Convention to incorporate climate refugees would be possible. Brown further 
argues that the issue is therefore better addressed through adaptation, and to consequently 
take actions to facilitate migration as an adaptation strategy (2007, p. 25f). To succeed, 
Brown argues, the issue has to be internationally recognised and adaptation as well as 
development policies in areas at risk need to significantly address people’s vulnerability 
to climate change, including more efficient use of already available resources, by 
providing local adaptation strategies as well as to relocate people from areas especially at 
risk (2007, p. 29). An increased information exchange and shared mandate should, 
according to Brown, be achieved through ameliorated communication between 
practitioners in different fields all related to forced climate migration such as human 
rights, migration and environmental organisations. An approach to migration as an 
adaptation strategy has to take into account the benefits that international labour mobility 
can bring, but at the same time protect developing countries from losing skilled labour 
(2007, p. 29f'). 
As Brown and Warner, the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2009) also 
criticises the view of migration as the failure of adaptation actions. Especially at early 
stages of environmental problems, migration is and has always been an adaptation 
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strategy and should thus be seen as such. CCIM is a complex phenomenon and therefore 
an approach that focuses on human-security needs to be applied (IOM, 2009, p. 5). 
To assist environmental migrants, the IOM (2009, p. 7) proposes a holistic and 
collaborative approach. According to this approach efforts undertaken should be focused 
on raising awareness of the challenges posed by climate change and the actions needed 
among policy-makers as well as the public. Furthermore, a better understanding of the 
linkages between environmental change and human migration is, according to the 
proposal, needed. It is further argued that as environmental migration is a complex 
phenomenon and linked to human-security issues and development, the issue of 
environmental migration needs to be mainstreamed into overlapping policy domains, and 
vice versa. Furthermore, the IOM stresses that humanitarian actions need to be provided 
enough resources to meet the new and growing challenge that climate change poses. In 
this line, efforts should be taken to decrease forced migration and instead provide 
resources to facilitate migration as a voluntary action taken to adapt to climate change. 
Such efforts could include for example the development of temporary and/or circular 
schemes for labour migration (IOM, 2009, p. 7). 
2.6 Analytical framework  
As presented above, the literature covering the ‘debate of the debate’ shows at least four 
perspectives within the field: The minimalist/alarmist, the maximalist/sceptical, the 
climate migrant perspective, and the climate refugee perspective. As the field is relatively 
new and authors use different labels for similar perspective it is of course difficult, if not 
impossible, to completely separate the perspectives from one another. Taking the 
polarisation and disagreement over definitions into consideration, I see these perspectives 
as currently under development. Hence, it should be noted that this categorisation should 
not be seen as exclusive, other perspectives could be identified.  
Felli developed a separation of the climate refugee and the climate migrant perspectives 
into two ideal types. As analytical tool for the remaining part of my analysis I have 
chosen to use Felli’s model for multiple reasons. 
First of all, the separation into the maximalist/alarmist and the minimalist/sceptical 
perspectives is relatively old. Much has happened within the field since Suhrke presented 
her ideas in 1993. Felli’s work is recent and therefore arguably gives a more accurate 
picture of the current state of the debate. Furthermore, the different time-frames I argue 
also make it hard to actually say if new perspectives have emerged or if the old debate 
between the maximalist/alarmist side and the minimalist/sceptical side has taken a new 
shape. For example, the maximalist/alarmist perspective did, in line with the climate 
refugee perspective, promote the use of the term ‘refugee’ and not migrant. Another  
example is for example Black’s (2001), above referred to as one of the most prominent 
speakers for the minimalist/sceptical side, more recent turn into promoting migration as 
an adaptation strategy (see e.g. Black, et al., 2011a, “Migration as adaptation”), in line 
with the climate migrant perspective. By pointing out these overlaps I would again like to 
stress the challenge in separating the four identified perspectives. Such separation could 
even be misleading. As argued in 1.2.1, these overlaps are illustrating one of the reasons 
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why I have chosen to talk about the sides in a more wage way; using the term 
‘perspectives’ and not ‘discourses’. Bearing this in mind I find the use of Felli’s model 
even more motivated, as it takes into account the change in the debate in general towards 
a higher focus on climate change adaptation, without excluding e.g. the still remaining 
definition-debate.  
In this line, Felli’s model elaborates views on the adaptation-migration nexus, an 
approach that I find in line with much of the recent literature in the field of CCIM. One of 
the most striking outcomes of the findings presented in this chapter is the important role 
that adaptation plays. The existence or non-existence of adaptation actions was pointed 
out to determine the future nature of the phenomenon. Regarding causes, the lack of 
adaptation actions was pointed out as one important explanatory factor, and accordingly 
was adaptation actions pointed out as one way of addressing CCIM. This view, however, 
is not uncontested and it was also argued that CCIM will not be possible to ‘adapt away’. 
Therefore, shedding light on the role of adaptation to climate change in the context of 
migration not only seems to be in line with the current debate, but also a key factor to 
examine different policy responses. Furthermore, this approach is also in line with much 
of the general work on climate change and the increased attention given to climate change 
adaptation in general. This can be illustrated by the progress in international climate 
change negotiations under the UNFCCC with the establishment of the Cancun Adaptation 
Framework in 2010, including the Work Programme on Loss and Damage and the 
Adaptation Committee, stating that climate change mitigation and adaptation should be 
equally addressed (UNFCCC, 2012b).  
Also, as I have not conducted a discourse analysis myself, but build on analyses presented 
in other works, I find it reasonable to use an existing model. This way I have the 
possibility to apply previous findings on another type of material, allowing for future 
adjustments. For the same reason I also find it more accurate to use broad rather than 
narrow perspectives. 
A point against using Felli’s model is that Felli himself argues that migration as the 
failure of adaptation has lost its dominance within academic writings. Felli however 
argues that the perspective is still important outside of the academia and within the 
popular literature, something that I also became aware of during the latest Conference of 
the Parties, COP18, at a side event named “Climate Forced Migrants: On the question of 
Rights and Responsibilities” (Warner, et al., 2012). As the title of the event suggests, the 
discussion circulated around the understanding that climate change will lead to large-
scale forced migration, a view that arguably has similarities with the maximalist/alarmist 
as well as the climate refugee perspectives; an important difference between Felli’s 
categories lies in the extent of voluntariness in the decision to relocate (see table 2.1 
down). Though the term ‘migrants’ was used in the title of the event, the discussions 
circulated around migration as the failure of adaptation actions, also in line with the 
climate refugee perspective. Furthermore, the panel argued that climate change is caused 
by actions of industrialised countries and therefore these countries should also bear the 
burden of the costs related to CCIM. Thus, migration in this case was framed as the 
failure of mitigation of greenhouse gases, not as an adaptation strategy. This event, I 
argue, is just one example of settings where the climate refugee perspective is still 
applied. Table 2.1 below shows the model used to analyse perspectives on CCIM, 
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presented in chapter four, using empirical findings from Bangladesh, presented in chapter 
three. 
Table 2.1 Migration as the failure of mitigation versus migration as a strategy for climate 
change adaptation 
Key points for the 
perspectives 
Perspective 
 Climate refugees – climate change 
induced movement as the failure of 
mitigation and adaptation measures 
Climate migrants – climate change 
induced movement as a strategy for 
adaptation 
Definition Climate refugee Climate migrant 
View of migration Failure Adaptation strategy 
Nature of migration 
(4.1) 
Forced Voluntary/distinction not useful/grey 
zone 
Environmental migration is part of 
human history 
Manageable/to be managed 
Responsibility (4.2) Climate change, produced by 
Northern countries 
Vulnerability (individualization of the 
responsibility or displacement on the 
‘victims’ or its territory) 
Storylines (4.3) ‘Sinking islands’, ‘barbarian 
invasion’ 
‘Humanity on the move’ 
Consequences of 
migration (4.3) 
 
Environmental degradation in the 
receiving territory, which could 
result in violent conflicts 
If properly managed: new resources, 
remittances, knowledge transfer 
If left unmanaged: disruptions, 
degradation, violence 
Climate policy (4.4) Mitigation Adaptation 
Institutional level (4.4) States 
International security 
International law 
Individuals/communities 
Human security 
Human rights 
Form of the law (4.4) New international convention or 
treaty 
Soft laws, internalization in domestic 
policies, policies diffusion 
Uses of ‘climate 
refugees/migrants’ (4.4) 
To underline the human 
consequences of climate change 
To underline the responsibilities of 
Northern countries 
To strengthen refugee/migration 
laws in receiving countries 
Replacement of mitigation policy by 
adaptation policy 
Promoting the ‘migration management’ 
and the institutional reform agenda 
As a source of labour-power in the 
North 
Consequences of 
responsibility 
assignation (4.4) 
Climate change mitigation 
Reparation (funding for adaptation 
to climate change, taking-in of 
climate refugees…) 
‘Capacity’ building of vulnerable 
countries 
Building ‘Resilience’ of vulnerable 
population 
 
Source: Modified by the author from Felli 2012 ( p. 9). For the original categorisation by Felli, please see 
annex 2 to the current work. 
Comments: Ideal types. Analytical framework employed for the analysis presented in chapter 4. Section of 
chapter 4 in which the respective key points of the perspectives are mainly discussed within brackets. 
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3. Climate change, migration and 
Bangladesh 
The complexity shown in the previous chapter highlights the challenge to predict the 
magnitude and the impacts of future migration due to climate change. This chapter sums 
up the findings from the conducted literature review regarding impacts of climate change 
on migration patterns in Bangladesh.
7
  
The chapter starts with a presentation of how climate change is likely to affect migration 
patterns within and from Bangladesh. Next, the changes in migration patterns are 
described. To understand the changes one arguably needs to put the issue in a wider 
context. Accordingly, a description of links between vulnerability and CCIM in the 
context of Bangladesh is provided. Finally, human security issues and conflicts as well as 
how to address such issues are explored. 
Bangladesh is located in Southern 
Asia, by the Bay of Bengal. Bordering 
countries are India and Burma. The 
county is approximately a third of the 
size of Sweden, holding a population 
of approximately 150 million people 
(year 2011). Most of the country 
consists of a large delta and few areas 
are located higher than ten meters 
above sea level (for an overview, see 
e.g. Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 2013). 
The high population density and 
coastal location make Bangladesh 
especially vulnerable to climate change 
impacts such as sea-level rise, 
especially as most people are living on 
the low-lying delta and are dependent 
on agriculture for livelihoods (see e.g. 
McLeman, 2011; Kartiki, 2011; 
McAdam & Saul, 2010; Sharma & 
Hugo, 2009). A more in depth analysis 
of Bangladesh’s vulnerability in the 
context of CCIM is provided in section 
3.3 below.   
                                               
7
 Further details on the result of the search for materials for the literature as well as a list of documents used 
can be found in annex 1 to the current work. 
Image 3:1. Map of Bangladesh 
Source: United States Central Intelligence Agency 
[Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons,  
available from 
<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ABg-
map.png> 
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3.1 Climate change impacts affecting migration patterns in 
Bangladesh 
Generally, in line with the findings presented in chapter two, and as will be further 
pointed out below, different changes in the environment lead to different responses 
regarding migration patterns, also in the case of Bangladesh. 
Results from studies of Bangladesh (Foresight, 2011, p. 81; Penning-Rowsell, et al., 2012 
, p. 14) show that long-term or permanent changes in the environment such as riverbank 
erosion and salination tend to lead to long-term migration. Contrary, storms and floods 
generally do not lead to permanent migration, as the environmental effects of these 
impacts generally are temporal. However, not only the type of impact but also the 
distance of migration has an impact on the duration of the same. For example, Kartiki 
(2011) studied the effects on migration after the cyclone Aila that struck Bangladesh in 
2008 and found the resulting migration to be mainly short-distance and temporal. It is 
however, Kartiki argues, likely that long-distance migration could result in more 
permanent resettlement (2011, p. 31). 
To mention some direct impacts from climate change on migration patterns within and 
from Bangladesh, Sharma and Hugo write that the three main impacts will be sea-level 
rise resulting in coastal flooding and inundation, riverbank flooding and 
cyclones/typhoons (2009, p. 5). These impacts are in turn related to higher temperatures 
and increased precipitation. The latter impact has also been pointed out as likely to impact 
Bangladesh with seasonal variability (Hassani-Mahmooeia & Parris, 2012, p. 2; 
Walsham, 2010, p. 19). Temperature and precipitation changes in turn negatively impact 
the agricultural sector (Walsham, 2010, p. 20). Studies of the impacts of desertification in 
the Asian context, including Bangladesh, show that desertification leads to both internal 
and international migration (Leighton, 2009, p. 330). 
According to a literature review by Walsham
8
, Cyclones are likely to increase in 
frequency and gravity in Bangladesh as a result of climate change. Existing evidence 
regarding migration caused by storms and cyclones show that these events are likely to 
cause sudden and temporal displacement. Therefore, in the case of cyclones, Walsham 
argues, disaster risk reduction could prove especially effective (2010, p. 11f). Some 
disaster management strategies are already in place in Bangladesh, and a comparison 
between the numbers of people killed from cyclones in Bangladesh in 2007 and 1970 
shows that substantially fewer people were killed in 2007, which could arguably partly be 
explained by increased resilience among populations (Foresight, 2011, p. 54). 
Salt-water intrusion is already a threat to coastal communities in some areas of 
Bangladesh. Walsham argues that adaptation options exist, such as changing agricultural 
practices, however “[…] major shifts in livelihoods will not only have an impact on the 
economy of these areas, they will affect every dimension of life, including the social and 
cultural sphere. Taken together, this represents a major challenge for future policy 
                                               
8
 Walsham did a comprehensive literature review covering climate change impacts on migration patterns in 
Bangladesh for the IOM. The literature review consisted of materials from a vast variety of sources 
including from academia, NGOs, national- bi and multinational organisation, as well as information from 
the government of Bangladesh. (Walsham, 2010) 
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towards those regions” (Walsham, 2010, p. 18). According to Walsham’s conclusion, 
salt-water intrusion seems to provide an example of climate change effects difficult to 
adapt to. 
According to Walsham’s (2010) findings Riverbank erosion is also already a threat for 
people living along Bangladesh’s rivers. However, though it is challenging to predict 
future impacts from river erosion, it is believed that an increase in monsoons from climate 
change might accelerate problems related to riverbank erosion. According to the review, 
families living near riverbanks usually have to relocate several times during their 
lifetimes. Furthermore, riverbank erosion is believed to lead to long-distance and long-
term displacement. However, Walsham argues, even though migration due to riverbank 
erosion in most cases can be described as ‘voluntary’ in some cases the changes are so 
severe and sudden that people or even entire communities are displaced (2010, p. 13f). 
Floods are, according to several studies, yet another example of environmental hazards 
that are already part of living in Bangladesh (Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 146; Walsham, 
2010, p. 9; Kartiki, 2011, p. 11). Floods impact life in Bangladesh in several ways. 
Fieldwork carried out after floods in Bangladesh in 1996 and 2005, including interviews, 
focus groups and meetings show that not only the direct impacts of lives lost, but also 
livelihoods and infrastructure are problematic (Findley & Geddes, 2011). The water 
masses also carry sand and dirt, spread diseases and bury farmland. The water sweeps 
away seeds and agricultural materials, thereby threatening not only current but also future 
harvests (Findley & Geddes, 2011, pp. 146-148).  
Case studies in Bangladesh show that, as flooding cycles both erode and add land, many 
displaced people stay nearby in the hope of returning after the flood, or to relocate to land 
formed elsewhere through the process of sedimentation (Black, et al. 2011b). This is 
however not always possible as sedimentation is a slow-process and new land does not 
always form in connection to eroded areas (Black, et al., 2011b, p. 442). 
Similarly, Walsham’s (2010) review shows that Coastal erosion is an on-going process in 
Bangladesh, which can be both a sudden- as well as a slow-onset event. Coastal erosion is 
a complex phenomenon and the impacts on migration are not always clear. In some areas 
land has actually been gained through the process of sedimentation rather than lost, 
however the new land is often not as good as the old agricultural land. Furthermore, as in 
the case of flooding cycles, land gained is often not in close connection to areas lost and 
relocation therefore complicated. Also, as the areas currently at risk change over time, it 
is hard to predict where land is under threat of being lost due to coastal erosion 
(Walsham, 2010, p. 15f). 
Coastal erosion is predicted to increase due to sea-level rise, as well as floods, saltwater 
intrusions and storms (Walsham 2010, p. 17). Predictions of future sea-level rise points at 
different scenarios, however sea-level rise due to climate change is likely to have an 
impact on Bangladesh (Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 146; Walsham, 2010, p. 17). 
Walsham (2010, p. 17), however, disagrees with predictions estimating high numbers of 
mass-migration due to sea-level rise, as a rise in sea-level is not predicted to happen over 
a night but gradually. Therefore adaptation measures can be taken and these could 
significantly change the number of people directly threatened. If adaptation actions are 
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being taken, Walsham argues that mass-migration as a result of sea-level rise is “highly 
unlikely” (2010, p. 18). 
McAdam & Saul write that there exists an academic consensus that Bangladesh will be 
severely affected by climate change, including sudden- as well as slow-onset events 
(2010, p. 6). However, it is challenging to isolate climate change related factors from 
others also impacting on the decision to migrate, as Bangladesh is a country that has 
always been affected by different types of natural disasters leading to displacement 
(McAdam & Saul, 2010, p. 8). To decide whether for example a flood is caused by man-
made climate change or a natural event is thereby problematic.  
In this line, Naik brings yet another perspective to the nature of migration due to natural 
disasters by pointing out that although natural disasters are “assumed” to lead to temporal 
displacement, this is hard to generalise; it is hard to define between different types of 
migration (2009, p. 282f). Thus, whether or not natural disasters lead to temporal or 
another type of migration is hard to conclude.  
Hence, several already existing environmental problems and natural hazards are likely to 
increase in intensity and/or frequency. Some impacts seem easier to handle, as they are 
already commonplace in Bangladesh, while others may force people to relocate; this is 
the topic for the next section.  
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3.2 How climate change impacts affect migration patterns 
within and from Bangladesh 
Several studies from Bangladesh show that impacts from climate change in most cases 
lead to internal migration, especially resulting in an increased urbanisation (McLeman, 
2011, p. 24; Hassani-Mahmooeia & Parris, 2012, p. 2; Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 9; Black, 
et al., 2011b, pp. 442, 445; Ahsan, et al., 2011, p. 164). Ahsan, Karuppannan and Kellet 
(2011) describe the trend as dramatic and argue that the reason cannot be explained solely 
by natural growth of urban areas and traditional rural to urban migration. External factors, 
such as climate change impact, are seen as contributing to this trend (Ahsan, et al., 2011, 
p. 165f). Contrary, Leighton (2009) describes the evidence for an increased urbanisation 
as conflicting after reviewing several studies. However, Leighton does point out some 
indications that urbanisation is in Bangladesh one effect after floods in particular 
(Leighton, 2009, p. 330). In this line, The National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) of 
Bangladesh, referred to by Martin, highlights that water intrusion leads to damaged crop 
cultivation and in turn to urbanisation in the search for alternative livelihoods (Martin, 
2009, p. 362). 
As shown in the previous section, many environmental hazards likely to increase in 
intensity and/or frequency due to climate change, are already affecting the Bangladeshi 
population. In this line, several authors point out that local migration can be a coping-
strategy after natural disasters and point out Bangladesh as an example of how 
populations have learned how to live with natural disaster by temporarily evacuating to 
safer ground (Kniveton, et al., 2008, p. 74f; Naik, 2009, p. 284; Foresight, 2011, p. 14; 
Penning-Rowsell, et al., 2012 , p. 11). Several researchers point out that the lack of full-
year employment as a result of environmental hazards often result in cyclic migration 
within Bangladesh to temporarily seek employment in other areas (Walsham, 2010, p. 13; 
Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 148; Black, et al., 2011b, p. 443; Penning-Rowsell, et al., 
2012 , p. 12; McAdam, 2011b, p. 12). Due to increasing impacts from climate change, 
cyclic migration is believed to increase as well (Foresight, 2011, p. 81). 
Hassani-Mahmooeia and Parris conducted a quantitative analysis employing an agent-
based model using data from Bangladesh district-level, including indicators such as: 
“Incidences of extreme poverty, socioeconomic vulnerability, demography, and historical 
drought, cyclone and flood patterns” (2012, p. 14). Hassani-Mahmooeia’s and Paris’ 
result predicts changes in demography over Bangladesh. Due to drought and floods, 
internal migration towards the east and northeast districts, which are less prone to be 
affected, is likely to increase. In numbers, Hassani-Mahmooeia and Paris predict from 
three to ten million new migrants until 2050 (2012, p. 14). 
Though most existing evidence from the literature about Bangladesh included in this 
review shows that CCIM will result in local migration within the Bangladeshi borders 
some indications of cross-border migration can be found. For example, Black, Kniveton 
and Schmidt-Verkerk point out that the neighbouring country of India offers higher 
salaries and better living-conditions, as well as strong social and cultural ties, making it 
an attractive destination  (2011b, p. 445). Several international migration pathways from 
Bangladesh, especially to India, exist already. However, the lack of data, makes it hard to 
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estimate the number of international migrants from Bangladesh (Sharma & Hugo 2009, p. 
9; McAdam & Saul 2010, p. 11). If this is a general problem it cannot be excluded that 
international migration is in fact bigger than anticipated. 
Another factor explaining cross-border migration from Bangladesh is that Bangladesh has 
traditionally been a labour sending country (Walsham, 2010, pp. 28-30; Black, et al., 
2011b, p. 442). Black, Kniveton and Schmidt-Verkerk show that most international 
permanent resettlement is to the UK or the US and that short-term migration abroad, 
mostly to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, has increased (Black, et al., 2011b, p. 442). 
Furthermore, areas most prone to experience climate change related hazards are situated 
close to the Indian border and increased cross-border migration can therefore, according 
to Walsham, not be excluded, though Walsham stresses that most migration is likely to be 
internal (2010, pp. 28-30). Another explanatory factor for international migration is that 
many migrant destinations within Bangladesh are already vulnerable. Though it is, Black, 
Kniveton and Schmidt-Verkerk (2011b) argue, difficult to estimate it can also not be 
excluded that if climate change impacts increase migration to these destinations, these 
areas will be further degraded. This in turn could result in a growth of international 
migration, as migrants might be forced to relocate once again, due to the degraded 
environment at the first destination (2011b, p. 445). 
Some writers also highlight positive effects from international migration. For example, 
cross-border migration can result in remittances sent back, which contribute to the 
country’s GDP, as well as transfer of knowledge and technology (Walsham, 2010, p. 8; 
Black, et al., 2011b, p. 442). In this line, Sharma and Hugo argue that most migration will 
be internal and that international migration is likely to be of a different nature, mostly 
undertaken by well-off, high skilled workers: “In most cases, international migration will 
manifest as a pragmatic livelihood strategy rather than as a plea for formal international 
legal ‘protection’ from the State harm or State failure in Bangladesh itself” (Sharma & 
Hugo, 2009, p. 14). 
3.3 How vulnerabilities related to climate change impacts in 
Bangladesh affect migration patterns 
Generally, mega-deltas, such as the Ganges-Brahmaputra in Bangladesh are especially 
vulnerable to climate change impacts (Kniveton, et al., 2008, p. 27; Walsham, 2010, p. 8).  
Specifically, the low-lying delta of Bangladesh is exposed to combined risks of tropical 
storms, seasonal flooding, subsidence and sea-level rise (McLeman, 2011, p. 24; Kartiki, 
2011, p. 24f; Kniveton, et al., 2008, p. 6; Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 4; McAdam & Saul, 
2010, p. 4; Hassani-Mahmooeia & Parris, 2012, p. 2; Gray & Mueller, 2012, p. 6000). 
Kartiki writes that although the most vulnerable people to climate change impacts are 
living on low-lying islands, deltas such as those in Bangladesh will have the most people 
affected, due to their large populations (2011, p. 24f). Indeed, the high population density 
in Bangladesh has by several researchers been pointed out as one of the explanations 
behind Bangladesh’s vulnerability to climate change impacts (McLeman, 2011, p. 24; 
Kartiki, 2011, p. 24f; McAdam & Saul, 2010, p. 4; Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 11; 
Reuveny, 2008, p. 5). 
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Also, main livelihoods in Bangladesh are found within the agricultural sector, highly 
dependent on natural resources, making the country vulnerable to changes in the 
environment (Kartiki, 2011, p. 24f; Hassani-Mahmooeia & Parris, 2012, p. 2; Sharma & 
Hugo, 2009, p. 5f; Walsham, 2010, p. 7; Black, et al., 2011b, p. 445; Salauddin & 
Ashikuzzaman, 2012, p. 55). In this context, Walsham (2010, p. 7) points out some 
contesting trends. For example, the population increase has declined and even though the 
rural sector is still the largest, its dominance has decreased. Furthermore, fewer people are 
living in direct poverty, though many people are still considered to be poor. Disaster 
preparedness has increased, but as a result of increased population, more people are 
exposed to environmental hazards (Walsham, 2010, p. 8). 
Kartiki (2011) lists a number of factors making Bangladesh vulnerable to impacts from 
climate change. These include resource dependency, poor housing conditions and water 
scarcity, which become even more critical in cases of salt-water intrusion due to 
insufficient embankments - further weakened by extreme weather events (2011, p. 26). In 
the context of migration, individuals who do not believe that embankments will be 
improved are more prone to migrate, while sufficient emergency aid can decrease out-
migration from affected areas (Kartiki, 2011, p. 31). 
The links provided by Kartiki show how not only vulnerability due to environmental 
factors affect migration - CCIM arguably also needs to be considered in the wider 
spectrum of human and societal vulnerability. 
3.3.1 How human and societal vulnerabilities affect climate change induced 
migration 
Several writers argue that climate change will put extra pressure on a population already 
vulnerable due to other problems such as political and socio-economic instability. Climate 
change affecting natural resources that the population live from will in turn worsen 
underlying problems (McAdam & Saul, 2010, p. 7; Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 12; 
McAdam, 2011b, p. 10). In this line, several studies point out that Bangladesh is a 
developing country and does not have enough resources to protect itself against the 
upcoming challenge (Kartiki, 2011, p. 24f; Hassani-Mahmooeia & Parris, 2012, p. 1; 
Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 4; Faris, 2009, p. 92f; Salauddin & Ashikuzzaman, 2012, p. 
55). Kartiki finds that although migration has long been a coping-strategy in Bangladesh, 
the impacts of climate change, along with the rise in population, has further triggered 
migration and put an extra burden on the population (2011, p. 28). 
Another link regarding impacts from natural disasters and environmental hazards on 
migration found in several studies is that these impacts not always lead to displacement - 
one of the main reasons being lack of resources (Naik, 2009, p. 282f; Sharma & Hugo, 
2009, p. 6; Walsham, 2010, p. 27; Foresight, 2011, p. 54). Furthermore, information 
about migration as an available option is a determinant for migration. Due to lack of 
information, migration may not even be considered as an alternative coping-strategy 
(Kartiki, 2011, p. 31; Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 150). Thus, the most vulnerable, and 
most in need of relocating from hazardous places, are the most unlikely to do so. Instead, 
better-off families are more likely to migrate as a response to climate change impacts in 
Bangladesh (Foresight, 2011, p. 84f; Kartiki, 2011, p. 31; McAdam & Saul, 2010, p. 11).  
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In this line another common conclusion from studies of CCIM in Bangladesh is that 
mostly well-educated people are likely to be attracted to move from rural areas to bigger 
cities, also internationally, although the latter is more uncommon as cross-country 
migration requires resources (Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 13f; Walsham, 2010, pp. 28-30; 
Black, et al., 2011b, p. 442). Due to lack of resources, very few poor people will move 
internationally and in general only the most affected by climate impacts and who also 
have links to the destination area as a safety net (McAdam, 2011b, p. 12). Generally, in 
cases where cross-border migration from Bangladesh does occur, social networks in the 
receiving areas, is an important pull-factor for migration (Foresight, 2011, p. 30; 
Leighton, 2009, p. 330; Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 11; Naik, 2009, p. 289; Kartiki, 2011, 
p. 32; Findley & Geddes, 2011, p. 155; Black, et al., 2011b, p. 443). 
Penning-Rowsell, Sultana and Thomson (2012) find that most people have strong ties to 
their land and migration is often seen as the last alternative when all attempts to maintain 
a living in the home-area have failed. In this line evidence from Bangladesh suggests that 
landless people were more prone to migrate (Penning-Rowsell, et al., 2012 , p. 14). This 
link was found to be especially strong for rural to urban areas (Kartiki, 2011, p. 32). 
Especially female-headed families with little or no land were even more prone to migrate 
(2012, p. 60). Generally, women are pictured as more vulnerable to climate change 
impacts as men traditionally take the decision whether to migrate or not (Kartiki, 2011, p. 
31; Walsham, 2010, p. 14; Penning-Rowsell, et al., 2012 , p. 14). 
Fieldwork carried out after floods in Bangladesh in 1996 and 2005 shows that 
communities that were inundated the longest or hardest were not necessarily the one’s 
that recovered the slowest, but those with the highest level of food insecurity (Findley & 
Geddes, 2011, pp. 146-150). 
In this line Gray’s and Mueller’s (2012) quantitative study, using multivariate models, on 
the effects on migration from floods and crop-failure found that floods had very little 
effect on migration. Crop-failure however resulted in a lower rate of migration among 
households directly affected. Instead among households nearby, not yet affected but at 
risk, migration increased significantly (2012, p. 6002f). This result can thus be seen in 
line with indications that vulnerability does increase migration, but that the most 
vulnerable do not have the resources to migrate. 
3.3.2 Vulnerability as a result of climate change induced migration 
Following the examples provided above, vulnerability is linked to migration patterns in 
Bangladesh in several ways. While vulnerability in terms of e.g. landlessness can be a 
push-factor for migration, it can also lead to involuntary non-migration because of lack of 
resources to undertake relocation to safer ground. But vulnerability is not only a cause (or 
restraint) to migration; it can also be the result of CCIM. 
For example, the impact of climate change on livelihood is a complex relationship. 
Studies from Bangladesh show that such impacts may force people to leave their land for 
a safer environment, thereby losing their permanent assets - their land and their savings - 
further increasing their vulnerability (Foresight, 2011, p. 84f).  Another associated long-
term negative impact is increased debt levels after natural disaster, as people might have 
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to sell all resources they have as well as taking loans to recover from the losses. However, 
this also puts them in an even more vulnerable situation (Findley & Geddes, 2011, pp. 
146-150; Penning-Rowsell, et al., 2012 , p. 12). In this context Penning-Rowsell, Sultana 
and Thomson also found that dependency on external aid when all assets are lost or sold 
is in turn increasing vulnerability and a longer timeframe for recovering is needed (2012 , 
p. 11). 
Another example is an increase in vulnerability after relocation to urban areas. Ahsan, 
Karuppannan and Kellet (2011) argue that while climate migrants might find alternative 
livelihoods in urban areas, and even create new jobs as they often are prepared to work 
for a very low salary, lack of housing puts migrants in a vulnerable position. This, in 
addition to low salaries, often make migrants dependent on charity and thereby placed 
under more social as well as economic stress (Ahsan, et al., 2011, p. 167f). Black, 
Kniveton and Schmidt-Verkerk (2011b) found that lack of housing for new-comers often 
results in illegal settlements, especially in slums, which increases vulnerability. Also, 
these areas lack security and the basic needs of human beings (2011b, p. 442). Walsham 
(2010, p. 25f) argues that significant challenges for maintaining human security is 
associated with urbanisation due to climate change impacts as urban areas, especially 
within the slum, are often unhygienic and under severe environmental pressure. 
Moreover, people displaced for longer periods often face food insecurity and health 
issues. The vulnerable position of being displaced and landless also raises other risks such 
as being exploited in several ways, including trafficking and especially women face the 
risk of physical and sexual harassments (Walsham, 2010, p. 26f). 
In addition to the risks associated with living in slums, Penning-Rowsell, Sultana and 
Thomson (2012) found that most Bangladeshi migrants are unskilled and therefore have 
difficulties finding durable employment. Employments given often comprise hard 
physical work often resulting in health problems (Penning-Rowsell, et al., 2012 , p. 12). 
The findings presented above show that migration due to climate change can lead to 
increased vulnerability. However, previous literature also presents examples of how 
resilience building could make people less vulnerable and less prone to being displaced. 
This is the topic for the next section. 
3.3.3 Reducing vulnerability in the context of climate change induced migration 
Surveys among populations affected by the cyclone Aila in 2008 shows that destruction 
of settlements as well as livelihoods were the most common reasons to migrate as well as 
lack of educational options for children in evacuation areas (Kartiki, 2011, p. 31). Also 
the fear of outbreaks of diseases and bad living conditions in the aftermath of a disaster 
are other push factors for migration (Kartiki, 2011, p. 31). Contrarily, Naik points out that 
people are psychologically able to stay when the first shock and fear after a natural 
disaster has diminished (2009, p. 282f). For example, a study after the 2004 tornado in 
Bangladesh shows that displacement did not occur (Paul, 2005, p. 381f). One possible 
explanatory factor for these contrasting evidences is the existence or absence of 
emergency aid. Emergency aid can decrease the likelihood of displacement after a natural 
disaster (Kniveton, et al., 2008, p. 74f; Walsham, 2010, p. 12). Another is the existence of 
community networks as well as the possibility to take micro-credits (Findley & Geddes, 
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2011, p. 149). Fieldwork, including focal-group discussions, carried out in areas prone to 
floods shows that community aid was more important for recovering after a disaster than 
external help (Penning-Rowsell, et al., 2012 , p. 10). However, if the shock is affecting an 
entire community, risk-sharing networks have likely been undermined (Gray & Mueller, 
2012, p. 6004). 
Indeed, results, presented under the Foresight project
9
 (2011), from Bangladesh also show 
that the possibility to take micro-loans may decrease the rate of migration, as migration of 
parts of the family sending remittances is otherwise common as a way to recover from 
loss of income. However, in some cases, an increase in salary in another location still 
provides a more beneficial strategy (Foresight, 2011, p. 143). 
3.4 Implications of climate change induced migration in 
Bangladesh 
In the sections above, several links between vulnerability and CCIM were pointed out. 
While vulnerability is a cause for migration, migration in turn leads to increased 
vulnerability and thus a greater risk of having to relocate again. This section will further 
describe these links by looking at how conflicts and human security issues on the one 
hand contributes to increased vulnerability as a result of CCIM and how adaptation 
actions on the other hand could be used to increase resilience among affected populations.  
3.4.1 Human security implications and conflicts 
McAdam and Saul (2010) found some indications that migration, both internally within 
Bangladesh and internationally (especially to India) can result in security issues. The 
writers, however, argue that it is important not to overstate the gravity of these problems 
(2010, p. 17). 
Sharma and Hugo (2009) point out religious insecurity for members of other religions 
than Islam and possible resulting conflicts as a driver for migration to India. However, 
Bangladeshis are not necessarily attracted to move to India. According to Sharma and 
Hugo, this can be explained by the risk of becoming part of the big Indian slum, as many 
Bangladeshis already are (2009, p. 10f). 
McAdam and Saul (2010) also find some evidence that migration can increase terrorism 
and radicalisation of groups within the country. Relocation can lead to conflicts over 
resources, especially in relation to rural-urban migration and the inter-linked growing 
slums where little resources are available (McAdam & Saul, 2010, pp. 17-20). As pointed 
out above, CCIM is often rural to urban, putting urban areas under pressure. Ahsan’s, 
Karuppannan’s and Kellet’s (2011) Results from surveys handed out to Bangladeshi 
residents relocated as a consequence of natural disasters show that most respondents 
migrated to urban areas in the search of alternative employments as farmland had been 
                                               
9
 Foresight provides advices for the UK government on future issues. The two-year project on migration 
and environmental change comprised some 350 experts and stakeholders. The final findings were published 
in 2011. More information about the project can be found at <www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/migration>  
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destroyed. Especially after the cyclones SIDR and AILA in 2007 and 2009, the waves of 
migrants to urban areas were particularly large, as the cyclones made millions of people 
homeless. Ahsan, Karuppannan and Kellet point out challenges to the urban planning 
system from CCIM, including increased demands on housing and water supply as well as 
greater pressure on sanitation, healthcare and other services. The authors argue that the 
impacts from such migration-pressure, risk increasing urban poverty and put urban areas 
under significant pressure: “Unforeseen levels of climate migrants affect orderly 
development of cities, urban land use, and urban economy” (Ahsan, et al., 2011, p. 167). 
In this line, Walsham (2010) points out that some studies suggest that sudden onset-
events might result in mass-migration and thereby security issues in the receiving areas, 
especially in urban slums. Slow-onset events are in their nature not as dramatic but 
arguably forcing more people to relocate, in turn causing environmental stress in the 
receiving areas (2010, pp. 25-27). Faris describes a worst-case scenario of “sudden, 
cataclysmic flooding”, which could result in tens of millions refugees in neighbouring 
countries (2009, p. 93). However, Gray and Mueller show that in some cases more and 
not less livelihoods can be found after an environmental disruption, as workers will be 
needed for restoration (Gray & Mueller, 2012, p. 6001). 
McAdam and Saul further found some indications of increased border-tensions. For 
example the boarders of India have been increasingly securitised and some indications of 
increased conflicts, especially of ethnic nature and an increase of religious terrorism were 
also found (2010, pp. 21-26). Also, “Nationalist political parties in India have frequently 
characterized Bangladeshi migrants as terrorist and jihadists” (McAdam & Saul, 2010, 
p. 24). McAdam and Saul (2010) also note a growth in “anti-Indianism” on the 
Bangladeshi political scene. Thus, future security issues related to CCIM into India 
depends on several factors, including the development of national politics within 
Bangladesh as well as in India. McAdam and Saul further stress that international 
migration is likely to be gradual, temporal and mainly consist of wealthy Bangladeshis, 
not masses of immigrants suddenly trying to cross the border. Also, the relationship 
between India and Bangladesh in this regard has, according to McAdam and Saul, 
improved, which leads the writers to see on the security issue with “cautious optimism” 
(2010, p. 26). 
Hence, future trends are difficult to predict, and depend on several factors such as the 
scale and nature of migration and which destination in India that will mainly be chosen by 
Bangladeshi climate change migrants. 
3.4.2 Adaptation and coping-strategies 
Walsham (2010, p. 26) argues that there is not necessarily a link between CCIM and 
insecurity, the relationship has to do with the responses taken to address the issue. 
Conflicts can be avoided if actions are taken to ease the migration and on how immigrants 
are being viewed and treated in receiving areas (Walsham 2010, p. 21). If migration is 
managed and actions are taken for increasing human security, migration from hazardous 
areas can be a good strategy for coping with environmental stressors and to address 
insecurity (Walsham, 2010, p. 26f). 
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Regarding international migration, McAdam and Saul proclaim a stronger focus on 
human dignity and development of strategies for out-migration in collaboration with 
Bangladesh’s neighbouring countries to encourage migration that would also be 
economically favourable is a way to lessen the tension and to address human security 
issues in relation to CCIM (2010, p. 41f). 
Regarding urbanisation, Hassani-Mahmooeia and Parris argue that bigger cities will have 
to be able to provide more non-agricultural livelihood opportunities to be able to cope 
with the increased pressure from migrants and decrease the risks of human insecurity and 
conflicts (2012, p. 15). In this context, Ahsan, Karuppannan and Kellet see a need for 
recognition of problems related to urbanisation and collaboration on different levels of 
decision-making, as climate change induced urbanisation is seen as a local problem but 
climate change in general is dealt with on the national level (2011, p. 170). 
Several authors argue that CCIM in general should be part of a holistic adaptation 
strategy and that migration as a strategy to handle environmental hazards already is 
commonplace in Bangladesh (McAdam & Saul, 2010, p. 41f; Sharma & Hugo, 2009, p. 
12; Walsham, 2010; Foresight, 2011, pp. 181-183). As resilience to climate change 
impacts is an important explanatory factor to changes in migration patterns in 
Bangladesh, the extent and success of adaptation strategies undertaken will partly decide 
the scope of the issue (McAdam & Saul, 2010, p. 9). 
However, surveys among affected people after the cyclone Aila in 2008 show that 
migration was not seen as an adaptive strategy as no increase in resilience was felt 
(Kartiki 2011). Kartiki argues that in cases of extreme events, migration cannot be seen as 
an adaptation strategy as migration may not improve household’s resilience, especially 
not if relocation results in lower income and/or conflicts (2011, p. 34). 
Thus, Kartiki argues that migration cannot be seen as an adaptation strategy in the case of 
extreme events. The difference between strategies for different impacts is showcased by 
Findley and Geddes (2011). The writers explain migration after floods in Bangladesh as 
part of life, resulting in acute short-term displacement. When long-term migration due to 
environmental changes does occur, this can better be explained by poverty and 
underdevelopment, forcing people to leave their homes due to food insecurity, or as a 
long-term adaptation strategy by households or entire communities (Findley & Geddes, 
2011, pp. 148, 155). Hence, migration as an adaptation strategy is not common as a 
response to floods, as also Kartiki’s results suggest, and it could arguably be assumed to 
be the same for other sudden, extreme events. However if migration is planned to address 
future floods, it could arguably be seen as a way of adapting to climate change impacts. 
Regarding the link between adaptation and migration, two strategies can be seen. One is 
to promote migration as an adaptation strategy, as McAdam and Saul and Walsham above 
argue. Another is to limit the need for migration by taking adaptation actions in 
vulnerable locations, thus increasing the population’s resilience. Deciding between the 
two options is, however, not uncomplicated.  
Hassani-Mahmooeia and Parris (2012) show that well-funded information is needed to 
take appropriate policy responses as the government might have to choose between 
increasing resilience in vulnerable areas, but risk making people stay in hazardous areas. 
On the other hand, using migration from hazardous areas as an adaptation strategy 
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increases the risk of putting migrating areas under high pressure (Hassani-Mahmooeia & 
Parris, 2012, p. 15). The results from the Foresight report (2011) show that the risk of 
promoting migration is increased pressure on other areas, and problems related to that, 
while the risk of undertaking local adaptation is to force people to stay in areas where 
they should not stay, trapping them there as the opportunities from migrating are slim. A 
concrete example from the Foresight project is the establishment of cyclone shelters. 
While shelters can reduce risks in Bangladesh today, providing shelters risks keeping 
people in vulnerable places, and shelters thus have to be robust enough to face not only 
current challenges, but also future challenges (Foresight, 2011, p. 54). 
However, Penning-Rowsell, Sultana and Thomson (2012) find that a combination of 
approaches such as improving embankments, protecting mangroves and providing 
training to increase skills, is to be preferred. They argue that increasing people’s 
resilience through local adaptation at the same time facilitate moving away if needed, as 
people would be more capable of doing so through decreased vulnerability (2012 , p. 13). 
- 40 - 
 
4. Theory meets reality in Bangladesh 
In this chapter, theory meets reality when perspectives on CCIM are used to explain and 
elaborate the findings from the literature covering evidence from Bangladesh. 
As an analytical tool, Felli’s (2012) model, presented in section 2.6 was used. The model 
covers the two contesting perspectives, the climate refugee perspective and the climate 
migrant perspective. The material from Bangladesh was first summarised (see annex 3 to 
the current work) and then sorted into a table modified from Felli’s original model (see 
annex 4 to the current work). 
The aim of the analysis presented below is to reveal similarities and differences of the 
perspectives, as well as to showcase how the perspectives would explain and address 
different impacts and evidences of CCIM. The aim is not to try to point out which of the 
perspectives that is ‘right’, but rather to point out what implications it would bring to 
follow one perspective or the other. 
4.1 Different types of climate change induced migration in 
the case of Bangladesh 
The two perspectives view CCIM in contesting ways. The climate refugee perspective 
sees climate migrants as the proof of the failure of climate change policies, and the focus 
of actions undertaken should be on mitigation and reparation of losses. Contrary, the 
climate migrant perspective sees climate migration as an adaptation strategy, thus 
focusing on adaptation policies within climate change politics.  
Generally it can be said that literature regarding CCIM in Bangladesh has identified all 
types of migration, but most dominantly different kinds of internal migration, especially 
circular, temporal and rural to urban. However, also cases of non-migration were pointed 
out as well as some indications of international migration. The lack of material regarding 
international migration was partly explained by the lack of data.  
Most literature seems to rather fall within the climate migrant perspective as it was 
pointed out that migration in Bangladesh is already a coping-strategy to deal with the fact 
that the agricultural sector does not provide year-round work and many families therefore 
send one or several family members to urban areas to compensate for the lack of income 
from agriculture during parts of the year. This was also found to be a coping-strategy to 
address especially sudden-onset events. Furthermore, the possibility to plan migration as 
a response to slow-onset events was pointed out. Thus, two key points from the climate 
migrant perspective - that migration is part of human history and that it can be managed, 
were evident in the literature. This was especially clear regarding international migration, 
where the importance of cultural bonds and historical pathways, especially to India, as 
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well the picture of Bangladesh as a country which has long been known as a labour 
sending country, were presented as explanatory factors. Migration in this regard was 
described as a livelihood strategy.  
A factor that more likely would be put forward by the climate refugee perspective is the 
nature of sudden onset events. Though evidence suggests that such migration in general 
does not result in long-term resettlement, such ‘migration’ would rather be termed 
‘displacement’ and the action forced.  Furthermore, the result is built on contemporary 
data, future climate change impacts are difficult to predict. Thus, if the intensity and 
frequency of sudden events would increase dramatically, it could arguably not be 
excluded that forced displacement from such events would be more long-term or long-
distance than today. Also, regarding international migration, areas most vulnerable to 
climate change are located close to the borders of India, thus an increase in future cross-
border migration cannot be excluded. Moreover, destination areas in Bangladesh are 
already suffering under degradation and with a further increase in immigration continued 
migration abroad seems likely. However, it should be noted that the review of materials 
collected from Bangladesh only to some extent predicts increases of negative effects from 
sudden-onset events. Furthermore, migration due to sudden events could be seen as an 
adaptation strategy, if migration is undertaken as a strategy to handle future risks.  
Some findings from Bangladesh regarding the nature of migration are hard to explain 
using the perspectives. There seems to be a relatively high degree of uncertainty in the 
material, which makes it hard to choose the most appropriate strategy to address the issue, 
regardless of which perspective one stands behind. For example it was shown that 
different changes in the environment give different migration responses. Though the 
complexity of the link between climate change and migration is strongly emphasised 
within the climate migrant perspective, this emphasis gives no guidance when it comes to 
policy responses which may have to be taken, other than that more research would be 
needed. A concrete example is the link identified between adaptation actions and 
migration. Here it was shown that choosing between local adaptation and migration as an 
adaptation strategy is not uncomplicated. Both responses have pros and cons. Taking 
local adaptation actions could increase a population’s resilience to such an extent that 
migration is no longer needed. However, local adaptation could also take away resources 
from the other option, to promote migration as an adaptation strategy, thus trapping 
populations in areas where they should not stay. If that happens, actions undertaken could 
instead be seen as the failure of adaptation.  
4.2 Causes and underlying mechanisms of climate change 
induced migration in the case of Bangladesh 
Regarding the view on causes and underlying factors explaining CCIM, one of the main 
differences between the perspectives is that while the refugee perspective sees the cause 
as climate change, the migrant perspective, stresses the importance of looking at 
resilience/vulnerability among affected populations for understanding what drives CCIM. 
Indeed, many factors making Bangladesh especially vulnerable to climate change were 
pointed out in the literature, for example the country's geographical position, lack of 
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adaptation measures and disaster preparedness in combination with high population 
density. Also, many underlying factors causing vulnerability and likely to increase by 
climate change were pointed out, such as poverty, underdevelopment, lack of land and 
poor housing. This could thus be seen as if many aspects of the nature of migration in 
Bangladesh are captured by the climate migrant perspective. Paradoxically, vulnerability 
as the cause of migration could only explain forced migration and not migration as an 
adaptation strategy. If migration would only be seen as an adaptation strategy, then 
vulnerability could not be an explanatory factor, as migration as an adaptation strategy 
sees migration as the best of available options, not a forced action. If sufficient adaptation 
actions are taken, there would be no climate refugees, only people who choose to live in 
other areas, as a strategic choice. This reasoning is however to take the perspectives to 
their extremes. It should be noted that Felli’s model describes ideal types of the 
perspectives. When e.g. looking at the policy proposals presented in section 2.5 in this 
work, a more nuanced image is found. For example, Biermann and Boas proclaim, in line 
with the climate refugee perspective, protection of climate refugees under an international 
treaty. However, they also propose a holistic view of adaptation actions, including 
planned relocation programmes, as long as these do not jeopardise the protection of 
affected populations (Biermann & Boas, 2010, pp. 77-82), a view that can be associated 
with the climate migrant perspective. Similarly, Brown, who in line with the climate 
migrant perspective stresses the need for seeing migration as part of a holistic adaptation 
strategy, also stresses the need for international recognition of the issue (2007, p. 29), a 
statement that captures one of the key features from the climate refugee perspective – to 
address CCIM on an international level.  
Nevertheless, the different perspectives have different views on vulnerability. How does 
the climate refugee perspective explain Bangladesh’s vulnerability? The logical answer 
seems to be that it explains vulnerability as a cause of climate change impacts. Thus, in 
this view, vulnerability as a consequence of climate change is separated from non-climate 
change caused vulnerability. Though the difference might not be very different to the 
people concerned, policy-wise there is a big difference as climate change caused effects 
are the result of industrialisation and should therefore be compensated by the actors 
causing climate change. This issue will be further elaborated in section 4.4 below. 
Regarding the decision to stay or to leave, the literature provides several explanatory 
factors. Generally, these factors are difficult to categorise as the failure of adaptation or 
migration as an adaptation strategy for two reasons. First of all, empirical evidence is 
contesting. Some works cited indicate for example that emergency aid did exist and that 
this in turn led to a possibility for affected populations to stay or only temporarily 
relocate. Other studies found the opposite result. Secondly, most factors can be seen as 
both. For example, the possibility to take micro-loans could be described as a proof for 
successful adaptation to climate change hazards, while the non-existence of such loans 
would be seen as the failure, or non-existence, of adaptation.  
Also, evidence indicates that most long-distance migrants are well-off and well-educated 
people. This latter point however, from my understanding, could also fall within the 
climate refugee perspective as this could suggest that people with few assets would not be 
able to strategically migrate but would rather be displaced as a consequence of 
environmental changes and hazards resulting in loss of livelihoods and resources. On the 
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other hand, evidence from Bangladesh points to how the lack of resources instead makes 
people less likely to relocate at all, as they have no resources to finance a move to safer 
ground. In other words: Forced non-migration, a phenomenon that the climate refugee 
perspective does not take into account. However, trapped populations, arguably rather 
show the failure of mitigation and adaptation, than migration as an adaptation strategy. 
From the climate migrant perspective it is argued that adaptation actions could lessen 
vulnerability, but whether or not this is doable does the evidence from the literature 
review not provide an answer to. 
Other vulnerabilities also difficult to separate are those leading to migration such as 
unemployment, destruction of settlements and landlessness. While migration caused by 
these vulnerabilities could be seen as an adaptation strategy; a way to improve one’s 
situation, it could also be described as the failure, or non-existence, of mitigation and 
adaptation measures. 
Many direct impacts from climate change were also described in the literature. These 
include for example sea-level rise, disruptions in regular precipitation patterns and 
increased temperatures. However, the literature also quite clearly points out the difficulty 
of separating climate change impacts and ‘normal’ changes – changes that would have 
occurred also without the impact from anthropogenic climate change. Also, many impacts 
from climate change are since long already part of living in Bangladesh and several 
writers argue that populations have already learned how to cope with these impacts.  
When trying to foresee the future, one can today never be sure which path is right to 
follow. It instead comes down to the view of science and ultimately, to politics. This was 
especially clear in the case of coastal erosion, where empirical evidence cannot tell 
whether or not this phenomenon will have increasingly negative or positive impacts due 
to climate change. 
4.3 Consequences of climate change induced migration in 
the case of Bangladesh 
From the literature review, some empirical evidences that the climate migrant perspective 
would put forward as a consequence of CCIM were found, for example transfer of money 
and other resources such as technology and knowledge. Other examples are less clear, but 
show the importance of context when discussing CCIM, in line with the focus of the 
perspective. For example, regarding conflicts and climate migration it was stated that the 
importance of conflicts as a consequence of migration depend on the context of the 
receiving area, but also on the development of internal political movements. 
One specific finding more in line with the view of the climate refugee perspective is the 
trend of an increased securitisation of the Indian borders to protect from inflows of 
immigrants. Such a trend better fits to the storyline ‘barbarian invasion’, than to 
‘humanity on the move’, as the purpose is to keep people out, rather than to promote 
migration as a lucrative process. 
The literature regarding consequences associated with CCIM reviewed in this work 
mainly displays migration as a failed adaptation strategy. One example is the indication 
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that rural to urban migration results in social and economic stress, leads to urban poverty, 
resource conflicts and a non-sustainable development of urban areas. Even if migration is 
undertaken with the aim of being an adaptation strategy it can lead to increased 
vulnerabilities through for example having to take loans or sell all assets to be able to 
migrate, or in the case of rural to urban migration, risks associated with living in slums as 
a result of lack of housing. Increased vulnerability could force migrants to relocate again 
– a trend that could arguably be described as the failure of migration as an adaptation 
strategy.  
This however, based on the material analysed, only suggest that seeing migration as the 
failure of adaptation is the best description of the phenomenon today. The literature 
review does not provide many examples of actions actually being put in place to increase 
the resilience of people relocating to urban areas; instead many proposals of undertaking 
such and other adaptation actions were suggested as a way of addressing climate change 
impacts.  
When it comes to consequences of CCIM, the perspectives are overlapping. Both 
perspectives argue that CCIM could lead to severe, negative consequences such as 
conflicts and environmental degradation. The difference is that the climate migrant 
perspective claims that these effects are possible to avoid. If migration is properly 
managed, CCIM could even bring positive effects.  The climate refugee perspective on 
the other hand focuses on the need to avoid CCIM by undertaking strong mitigation 
actions. As the literature overall did not provide much specific empirical evidence on 
existing efforts to manage CCIM in Bangladesh, merely the need to do so, adaptation 
actions cannot yet be evaluated, using this material, and it cannot be claimed that negative 
consequences of climate change impacts could not be avoided through climate 
management.  Future experiences will show if the adverse effects of climate change on 
migration are possible to 'adapt away', or not. 
4.4 Addressing climate change induced migration in the case 
of Bangladesh 
When it comes to policy responses to CCIM, the climate refugee perspective focuses on 
mitigation and reparation actions while the climate migrant perspective focuses on 
capacity and resilience building. The perspectives focus on different types of regulation 
on different levels. The climate refugee perspective focuses on a state level and on 
international security and law, proposing a new international regime or treaty, while the 
climate migrant perspective focuses on the local and individual level, using a human 
security and human rights approach and instead promotes soft laws, policy diffusion and 
internalisation of CCIM in domestic policies.  
Bearing in mind that empirical evidence from Bangladesh does not present many concrete 
examples of adaptation actions addressing CCIM, not surprisingly most of the strategies 
proposed to address negative impacts include adaptation actions. Examples given are 
suggestions that bigger cities will have to adapt to increasing inflows of people from rural 
areas, an increased cooperation between levels of decision-making to design suitable 
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adaptation plans as well as mainstreaming planned migration not only as an adaptation 
strategy but also as a way of addressing human insecurity. Furthermore, several writers 
were found to promote the idea of migration as part of a holistic approach, comprising for 
example migration as a planned, long-term strategy to avoid future risks. Also, many 
examples on how to increase capacity and resilience were given. Examples include 
micro-loans, community networks and the direction of migration to areas where 
workforce is needed. All these suggestions are in line with the climate migrant approach 
of focusing on adaptation policy instead of mitigation and to manage migration in an 
efficient way as in planning migration to areas where labour-power is needed. 
These proposals also hold several similarities with some of the policy proposals presented 
in chapter two. For example, Warner (2010), the IOM (2009) as well as Brown (2008) all 
promote the importance of strengthening adaptation to climate change as a way to address 
CCIM, including migration management. Another similar approach between these three 
specific proposals is to mainstream climate change policies with e.g. development 
policies as well as to increase cooperation and communication between levels. In the case 
of Bangladesh, mainstreaming actions to address CCIM with other actions could mean a 
more efficient use of resources, for example regarding emergency aid. Following 
Warner’s proposition regarding a platform to exchange good practices and lessons 
learned, more efficient use of adaptation actions and how to adapt actions after context 
could be a way forward. Moreover, as Bangladesh is often pictured as one of the states 
that will be most affected by climate change impact, other regions could arguably learn 
from the experience of Bangladesh. 
I argue that the main gap found in policy proposals from the climate migrant perspective 
is that though many concrete examples were given, how these actions would be put in 
place was left unanswered, taking the degree of poverty in Bangladesh into account. 
While the climate refugee perspective argues that funding from developed countries will 
be needed and should be provided, the climate migrant perspective is more unclear in that 
regard. One possible answer in line with the climate migrant perspective is increased cost-
effectiveness. If e.g. migration is undertaken in a planned way, both sending and 
receiving areas could benefit from this. I am however left wondering to what extent it is 
likely that such planned migration strategy will be possible, especially in the world of 
today where borders are not opened and people not free to move as they wish. I am also 
left wondering if such a strategy is morally sound. Seeing the world as an open area of 
demands and resources does allow for an efficient use of resources. Here, however, the 
resources are human beings and though some probably would be happy to move away 
from hazardous areas to other areas where labour-demands are high, I find it unlikely that 
this will always be the case. As the literature review showed, most people have strong 
connections to their land and often chose to return after natural disasters. I find it 
especially unlikely to be positively received among affected populations if this would 
mean to constantly be ‘on the move’, as the climate migrant storyline suggests, and to 
relocate time after another depending on the demand of workforce.  
The only proposal found that could also be linked to the climate refugee perspective is the 
need to collaborate with neighbouring countries to encourage migration and to lessen 
tension, as the climate refugee perspective argues that problems associated with CCIM 
should be addressed on a state/international level through an increased taking-in of 
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climate refugees from other countries. On the other hand, in this proposition migration is 
planned and could thereby also be described as an adaptation strategy. Since the materials 
used covering CCIM were mainly recent, the lack of suggestions of mitigation or 
reparation actions could also be explained by the recently growing focus on adaptation to 
climate change. 
Comparing the case of CCIM in Bangladesh with some of the general proposals presented 
in chapter two some similarities can be drawn to the climate refugee perspective. 
Examples include Biermann and Boas (2010) as well as Docherty and Giannini (2009) 
proposals and to some extent also Williams (2008) proposal on regional cooperation. 
Applying these on the case of Bangladesh would mean that CCIM in Bangladesh would 
be recognised by the international community. Moreover, funding for adaptation actions 
would be provided by the international community. Also, depending on which suggestion 
to follow, more or less of the affected Bangladeshis would also be entitled to protection 
under international law or under regional frameworks. However, in the case of trapped 
populations the proposed solutions do not provide protection. Moreover, in the case of 
IDPs, the proposals apply contesting approaches. Following Biermann and Boas (2010, p. 
67) proposition, IDPs would be included. Following Docherty and Giannini (2009, p. 
350), they would not. In the case of Bangladesh the literature review suggests that 
whether IDPs are included or not would make a big difference, as most migration is 
thought to be internal. Another gap that I see in these specific policy recommendations 
has to do with the implementation of the proposals. For example Biermann and Boas 
write that climate refugees would be able to resettle to host-states willing to take them in 
(2010, p. 75). I am however left wondering what would happen if states are not willing to 
take these people in. Furthermore, taking into account the resistance of states in the 
international climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC, is it reasonable to think 
that states would agree on a topic as contested as migration is in general? To answer this 
question Williams’ suggestion seems to lie somewhere in between the climate refugee 
and the climate migrant perspectives, as Williams does argue that international 
cooperation seems unlikely at this stage, but could perhaps be realistic if cooperation 
starts on a regional level (2008, p. 522). 
4.5 Summing up: Climate change induced migration and the 
case of Bangladesh 
One of the most striking result from the analysis of CCIM in Bangladesh is that even 
though many authors promote migration as an adaptation strategy and the possible 
solutions to a range of problems from changes in the environment to exploitations of new-
comers to the slum from adaptation, the state of today seems to be rather pointing at the 
failure of climate change adaptation policies, than as a successful adaptation strategy. 
Following this result the question that needs to be answered to decide what actions to put 
in place is whether or not this finding is the result of the failure of adaptation, or the non-
existence of adaptation actions. In a simple way it could be argued that if adaptation has 
failed and adaptation anyway will not be sufficient to address the adverse effects of 
climate change, then the remaining policy response would be to take very strong 
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mitigation actions to try to limit the damage as much as possible. If adaptation actions 
instead have not been employed, then such actions would have to be put in place to be 
able to evaluate their effectiveness. As long as adaptation actions are not undertaken, it is 
not possible to decide to what extent such actions would be able to address problems 
associated with CCIM. The review of empirical evidence from Bangladesh suggests that 
adaptation actions have not, to a large extent, been undertaken. This conclusion is based 
on the fact that most authors writing within the field promote adaptation as a policy 
response. If adaptation actions were already put in place and proved non-effective, then 
such proposals would seem unnecessary.  
Could it in fact be that the main difference between the two perspectives is that while the 
climate migrant perspective promotes adaptation actions, the climate refugee perspective 
does not believe in the success of such actions? Indeed, the climate migrant perspective 
does come out as more positive in the sense that it points out benefits from migration, 
while the climate refugee perspective rather focus on negative aspects such as conflicts.  
In a way the perspectives do not stand so far from each other as one might first think. 
They do recognise and address the same issue. They differ in their focus and the aspects 
of the issue that they stress. I have argued that one of the main gaps when applying a 
climate migrant perspective is the lack of how resources would be given to undertake the 
actions proposed. The climate refugee perspective addresses this gap by proclaiming the 
need for international protection, compensation and funding. I have further argued that 
the main gap when applying a climate refugee perspective is what could perhaps be 
described as a lack of recognition of what is achievable in the world of today, as well as 
the non-consistency in addressing internal displacement. These gaps are addressed by the 
climate migrant perspective by focusing on the complexity of CCIM, including the many 
types of migration and the many depending causes and effects, as well as promoting soft 
laws and a holistic strategy. This is an approach that I see more likely to be well-received 
within international climate negotiations, taking the reluctance to commit to binding 
international climate treaties into consideration. Would it then not be possible to merge 
these perspectives together, as they address each other’s gaps? I believe that such a 
conclusion would be convenient but not achievable. The climate refugee perspective 
stresses the need for funding and compensation, but it is unclear who would be entitled to 
these resources. By establishing a workable definition; a definition with clear boundaries, 
the holistic approach of the climate migrant perspective is lost. Some people will be 
included, but others excluded. Vice versa, by promoting a holistic approach and soft laws, 
the strength of commitment by the international community that the climate refugee 
perspective promotes would be lost and resources difficult to claim as no actors are 
obliged to take responsibility. 
Another convenient solution for addressing CCIM would be to find a middle-way: To 
take both mitigation and adaptation actions, just in case. In the best of worlds this would 
be possible. However, and as the literature review covering research on the case of 
Bangladesh shows, resources are limited and to be able to decide which action that is the 
most cost-effective cannot be underestimated.  
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5. Conclusions 
This chapter starts with a brief summary of the findings presented in the current work. 
Next, a discussion on how a way forward regarding CCIM could be pictured will be 
given, including some thoughts regarding future research. 
5.1 Summary 
Perspectives on CCIM and main debates were presented in chapter two. From the 
literature review at least four perspectives were found: The maximalist/alarmist, the 
minimalist/sceptical, the climate migrant perspective and the climate refugee perspective. 
It should however be noted that, due to the disagreement over definitions and the on-
going debate within the field, other perspectives could be identified.  
Main debates:  
 The role of climate change adaptation in the field of CCIM: Should migration due to 
climate change be seen as an adaptation strategy or as the failure of mitigation and 
adaptation actions? 
 Definitions: Should people undertaking CCIM be called migrants, refugees or displaced 
people? Are they forced to relocate or are they voluntarily migrating? 
 Type of CCIM: Is CCIM likely to follow historical patterns and remain internal, or will 
the impacts lead to international mass-migration?  
 Causes: Is climate change a main driver of migration or can underlying factors such as 
underdevelopment better explain the existence of CCIM? 
 Addressing CCIM: Should climate change motivated migrants be protected under the 
existing refugee regime, a new international treaty or rather through soft laws and 
adaptation actions? 
In chapter four, the two contesting perspectives, the climate migrant and the climate 
refugee perspectives were elaborated on empirical findings from Bangladesh. Regarding 
policy recommendations the climate refugee perspective proclaims the recognition of 
climate refugee by the international community, including protection under an 
international regime. The perspective also stresses the importance of reparation of and 
compensation for losses due to CCIM. Addressing CCIM needs resources, both 
institutions as well as human resources as in e.g. experts as well as finances from e.g. an 
international fund provided by the developed world.  
The climate migrant perspective instead sees migration as part of a holistic adaptation 
strategy, including soft laws and a bottom-up perspective. In this vein, collaboration is 
needed to increase cost-effectiveness and efficiency, through e.g. planning of migration to 
areas where workforce is needed.  
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Regarding similarities and differences between the policy recommendations, the main 
point, I argue, comes down to the view on adaptation. Both perspectives do stress the 
importance of adaptation actions, the difference lies in the extent to where one believes 
that adaptation actions can take us. The climate migrant perspective seems to see 
adaptation, in the sense of capacity building, as key. This can thereby take the form as 
both local adaptation and migration as adaptation. The climate migrant perspective does 
not see migration as an adaptation strategy and not only adaptation actions to decrease 
vulnerability need to be undertaken, also reparation and compensation to the affected 
populations should be provided.  
Main gaps in the climate migrant perspective’s policy recommendations include how 
adaptation actions would be financed and whether it is possible and morally sound to 
fully apply migration as an adaptation strategy to address CCIM. 
Main gaps in the climate refugee perspective’s policy recommendations include the lack 
of consideration of the political will for an international treaty to protect climate refugees 
and how to address the issues of trapped populations and IDPs.  
5.2 The way forward 
To conclude this work it would be easy to say that the question is complex and in need of 
further investigation. Though this, I believe, is true I also think that, considering the 
complex nature of the issue that the literature review revealed, a fair and objective 
definition of climate refugees/migrants/displaced people, is impossible to make and 
further research will therefore always be needed. For example, determining the extent of 
CCIM depends on the efforts made in the fields of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. Thus, the number of expected climate migrants, if even possible to predict, 
will constantly fluctuate. Furthermore, as future predictions build on models, an exact 
answer will never be given. Models gives a simplistic picture of a world in miniature, a 
model will never be able to incorporate the entire world and every dependent and 
interdependent variable. One can come close to reality, but a model will never be the 
reality. Moreover, modelling the world also depends on how we see the world. Following 
some thoughts from discourse theory, the world we see around us differs depending on 
the lenses we wear. Discourses shape the society and determine available policy-options. 
Possible policy-actions might not even be recognised as options, simply because they fall 
outside of the picture of the society we can imagine, and our understanding.  
Bearing this in mind, another point that I would like to stress is the perhaps obvious, but 
seemingly often forgotten, fact that if asking different questions to different types of 
materials and empirical findings, one is consequently likely to get different answers. By 
saying this I would like to argue that the climate change and migration debate might not 
be as divided as thought of at first glance. For example, the maximalist/alarmist 
perspective tries to provide an answer to what might happen in the future, using different 
models and predictions. The minimalist/sceptical perspective on the other hand instead 
looks at what has already happened, using another set of empirical data that tries to 
describe and understand the links. However, they both, more or less explicitly, argue that 
taking adaptive measures will reduce the risks associated with CCIM.  
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It is also quite clear from the literature review that migration can even be put forward as a 
good strategy for adapting to a changing climate, but not always. Losses and damages due 
to climate change are unavoidable, simply because climate change is already part of the 
everyday life of many people and actions have so far not been adequate. 
Furthermore, it would be ignorant not to also include the emotional stress that migration 
brings. Even though moving to another city, region or country can provide good 
opportunities for everyone involved, the migrant as well as the receiving area, this is not 
always the case. Failed immigration policies can be found in many different places all 
around the world, as well as racism and xenophobia. Where immigrants do not have the 
same opportunities and are treated in a negative way. Though I believe that much can be 
achieved from bringing forward the positive sides of human mobility, the costs for the 
people involved should not be ignored and needs to be firmly addressed. Though it might 
be politically attractive to support migration as a planned adaptation strategy, as the 
strategy is illustrated as a win-win situation for sending as well as receiving areas, the 
political gain will not be as high if the illustration is an illusion. To get a realistic picture 
of the implications of the strategy I would like to propose some questions for further 
research. Questions that I would suggest to focus on include: What happens after 
migration? Does relocation decrease vulnerability? If not, what could be done and what 
resources would be needed to decrease negative effects? More generally this work found 
many proposals for adaptation actions but little evaluation on their effectiveness. 
Therefore I would also propose further research regarding the effectiveness of adaptation 
actions in the context of CCIM, including local adaptation as well as migration as an 
adaptation strategy. 
Even though one finding from this study is that the debate regarding CCIM seems to 
follow the more general climate change debate in that it today puts more emphasis on 
adaptation actions, than before, this turn is not consistent everywhere. For example the 
maximalist/alarmist view was very much present even at the most recent COP, as 
previously described. How come, despite so much criticism, the alarmist view of CCIM 
still remains and is still cited? One thought is that it is simply because the narrative is still 
a useful tool for shaping the public opinion. Going back to the brief description of 
discourse theory presented in section 1.2.1, discourses can be described as shaping our 
society and the importance of a certain discourse as the extent to which it impacts the 
space of available policy options. From my understanding this means that if a discourse is 
successful, as in shaping the society, successful discourses also tell us something about 
which policy recommendations that are likely to be implemented. In this case this would 
mean that if the alarmist/maximalist view is still successfully shaping our society, the 
space of available policy recommendations would likely include different kinds of 
boarder protections to protect from international mass-migration. A further elaboration on 
the strength of different discourses is outside the scope of this thesis. However, with this 
thought I would like to bring forward two points. First I would like to stress the 
importance of further research on perspectives and discourses of CCIM, and to highlight 
the value in extending analyses to include more views, including the alarmist/maximalist 
perspective despite its argued disappearance within the academics. What I believe the 
debate of different perspectives has and will contribute to, is to point out different aspects 
and to showcase how complex the link between climate change and migration is. By 
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doing so, international politics have a better overview and could build in some kind of 
flexibility to the process, allowing for revising the decision with new findings, according 
to the state of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures undertaken. In this vein 
the importance of continuing the debate on CCIM within academia cannot be understated, 
as it looks like the world sooner rather than later will have to decide upon a workable 
definition. As already cited, the COP, for instance, decided during its last meeting that by 
the end of the  year 2013 a decision regarding loss and damage and an international 
mechanism regulating this issue, will be taken.  
Second, I would like to highlight the importance in adapting contemporary policy 
proposals to the current state of affairs.  
One important point that I do find that the climate migrant perspective implicitly brings 
out by arguing that CCIM should be dealt with on a national or local level is how far 
international negotiations can take us and what agreements are realistic to expect. Taking 
into consideration that climate negotiations in general are not easy and straight forward 
and the difficulties of agreeing on even the most basic issues, addressing CCIM is not for 
the faint hearted. Observing the international climate change negotiations closely, from 
the UNFCCC secretariat as well as from COP 18, made me realise that this is not a 
question about finding the best way forward – it is a question about acting now and to act 
in a way that is possible today, not in the future. Migration in the context of climate 
change is not just a question of protection of affected and vulnerable populations. It is a 
question about resources and about power. Though I strongly believe that it is unfair that 
the ones having very little to do with causing the problem have to pay the price, it is 
important to be realistic when suggesting new policies and to take into account existing 
power-structures. Rather than suggesting how we should do in the best of worlds, we 
should focus on actions that are actually possible. People suffering under the effects of 
climate change do not benefit from illusionary visions. A first step would indeed be to 
recognise the issue at all and to provide resources to build resilience. Though this, I find, 
is unlikely to be enough, it is a start. If a process has started it is more likely to continue. 
In this vein, maybe one way is to also see that some things are actually already being 
done, through e.g. development aid. This way, actions get credit for the benefits they 
bring and could hopefully motivate further actions. 
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Annex 2. Felli’s original model 
This annex includes the original separation of the climate migrant and the climate refugee 
perspectives, as in the article published in 2012. The difference towards the table 
displayed in section 2.6 is the order of the rows to better fit the order of the chapters in the 
current work.  
 
Table Annex 2: Felli’s original model 
Two competing discourses 
 Climate refugees  Climate migrants  
Climate policy Mitigation Adaptation 
View of migration Failure Adaptation strategy 
Nature of migration Forced Voluntary/distinction not 
useful/continuum/’grey zone’ 
Environmental migration is part 
of human history 
Manageable/to be managed 
Responsibility Climate change, produced by 
Northern countries 
Vulnerability (individualization 
of the responsibility or 
displacement on the ‘victims’ or 
its territory) 
Consequences of responsibility 
assignation 
Climate change mitigation 
Reparation (funding for 
adaptation to climate change, 
taking-in of climate refugees…) 
‘Capacity’ building of 
vulnerable countries 
Building ‘Resilience’ of 
vulnerable population 
Consequences of migration Environmental degradation in 
the receiving territory 
If properly managed: new 
resources, remittances, 
knowledge transfer 
If left unmanaged: disruptions, 
degradation, violence 
Institutional level States 
International security 
International law 
Individuals/communities 
Human security 
Human rights 
Form of the law New international convention or 
treaty 
Soft laws, internalization in 
domestic policies, policies 
diffusion 
Storylines ‘Sinking islands’, ‘barbarian 
invasion’ 
‘Humanity on the move’ 
Uses of ‘climate 
refugees/migrants’ 
To underline the human 
consequences of climate change 
To underline the responsibilities 
of Northern countries 
Replacement of mitigation 
policy by adaptation policy 
Promoting the ‘migration 
management’ and the 
institutional reform agenda 
As a source of labour-power in 
the North 
 
Source: Felli 2012, p. 9 
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Annex 3. Summary of Chapter 3: 
Climate Change, Migration and 
Bangladesh 
This annex covers a summary of the findings from the literature presented in Chapter 3. 
The summary below was categorised into Felli’s (2012) model (see Annex 5 below) and 
used as the baseline for the analysis presented in chapter 4 above. 
 
3. 1 Climate change impacts affecting migration patterns in Bangladesh 
 Different changes  different responses 
o Sudden onset events: short-term and short-distance 
o Slow onset events: long-term and long-distance (can be planned!) 
o  Long distance migration  long-term/permanent resettlement   
 Higher temperatures - Regional variabilitynegative impacts on agriculture 
 Changes in precipitation - Regional variability negative impacts on 
agriculture 
 Decertification/drought 
 Cyclones: will increase, already part of living, leads to sudden and temporal 
displacement, disaster risk reduction can be effective 
 Salt-water intrusion is already a threat but likely to increase and the impacts 
on livelihoods can be severe 
 Floods: will increase, already part of living, people try to resettle on new land 
from sedimentation  
 Coastal erosion: on-going process. Sudden or slow process. Hard to predict 
 Increase in monsoons  increase in riverbank erosion. Hard to predict and 
already part of living 
 Sea-level rise  increase in floods, salt-water intrusion and worsen the gravity 
of storms. Slow-process – adaptation possible 
 Difficult to separate climate change impacts from ‘natural’ changes 
 The kind of migration that climate impacts bring, as well as to what extent 
migration is voluntary, is hard to say  
3.2 How climate change impacts migration patterns within and from Bangladesh 
 Internal 
o Most CCIM is and is likely to remain internal 
o Increased urbanization 
o Local migration 
 Evacuation 
 Already common coping-strategy 
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o Circular/short-term migration 
  to find alternative livelihoods 
 International 
o There exist already several international migration pathways from 
Bangladesh, especially to India.  
 Cultural bonds 
 Social networks 
 Better income 
o The lack of data makes it hard to estimate the number, thus 
international migration could be bigger than anticipated. 
o Area’s most prone to experience climate change related hazards are 
situated close to the Indian border  
o Destination areas for CCIM within Bangladesh are already vulnerable 
 international migration 
o Bangladesh has long been known as a labour sending country.  
o Transfer of money (remittances), knowledge and technology are 
important benefits from international migration 
o Most people migrating are likely to come from the wealthier part of the 
population and international migration will manifest as a pragmatic 
livelihood strategy  
3.3 How vulnerabilities related to climate change impacts in Bangladesh affect 
climate change induced migration 
 Geographical position and nature 
 High population density 
 Dependence on natural resources for livelihoods 
 Lack of adaptation measures/disaster preparedness 
 
3.3.1 How human and societal vulnerabilities affect climate change induced migration 
 Underlying factors such as socio-economic instability and poverty already makes 
the population vulnerable to environmental hazards and climate change is likely 
to increase vulnerability 
o Poverty  no resources to relocate 
 Typically only well-off people and/or people with social 
networks undertake international migration  
o Unemployment  
o Destruction of settlements 
o Destruction of livelihoods 
o Landlessness 
o Gender 
o Lack of information about the option of migrating 
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3.3.2 Vulnerability as a result of climate change induced migration 
o Risks associated with urban living, especially in slums 
o Bad living conditions in evacuation areas/fear of outbreaks of diseases 
in evacuation areas (included in section 3.3.3, author’s comment) 
o Poor educational options for children in evacuation areas (included in 
section 3.3.3, author’s comment) 
o Landlessness 
o High debt levels 
o High dependency on external aid 
3.3.3 Reducing vulnerability in the context of climate change induced migration 
o Existence of emergency aid 
o Possibility to take micro loans 
o Community networks 
o Better pay and more jobs elsewhere 
o Sending remittances 
3.4 Implications of climate change induced migration in Bangladesh 
3.4.1 Human security implications and conflicts 
 Religious insecurity 
 Terrorism and radicalization within the country 
 Conflicts over resources, especially in relation to rural-urban migration and 
thereby growing slums where little resources are available.  
o Increased challenges for orderly development of cities, urban land use 
and urban economy  urban poverty, food insecurity and health 
problems. Risk of being exploited, including trafficking and 
harassments 
 Conflicts are especially likely in cases of sudden events resulting in mass-
migration 
 However, slow-onset events could result in more people displaced and thus 
environmental stress in the receiving areas.  
 The boarders of India have been increasingly securitized, to protect from 
immigrants 
 Ethnic conflicts and religious terrorism 
  “Anti-Indianism” on the Bangladeshi political scene increases the likelihood 
of ethnic conflicts between Bangladeshi immigrants and Indians. Thus, future 
security issues related to CCIM into India will also depend on the 
development of national politics within Bangladesh.  
 The degree to which migration result in security issues dependent on the 
context of the area to which region migration takes place as well as the scale 
and nature of migration (sudden or gradual) 
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3.4.2 Adaptation and coping-strategies 
 Conflicts can be avoided if actions are taken to ease the migration, such as: 
o stronger focus on human security/dignity  
o develop strategies for out-migration in collaboration with Bangladesh’s 
neighbouring countries to encourage migration that would also be 
economically favourable is a way to lessen the tension 
o Planned migration can be a way to address insecurity 
o Preparing urban areas for increased immigration 
o Recognition of problems related to urbanization in different levels of 
decision-making and collaboration between levels 
 Migration should be part of a holistic approach to climate change adaptation 
 Migration is already a coping-strategy to handle environmental impacts 
 Evidence of migration as an adaptation strategy are somewhat contesting and 
depends on e.g. resources in the receiving area as well as the impact in 
question. Migration as a response to disasters is not common, however if 
migration occurs as a way of addressing future risks, it could be seen as 
adaptation to climate change impacts 
 Two links between adaptation and migration, both with pros and cons:  
o As an adaptation strategy: Risking security implications 
o Adaptation to take away the need of relocation: Risking trapping 
populations 
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Annex 4: Categorisation of the findings 
from the literature review 
This annex comprises the categorisation into Felli’s (2012) model of the findings from the 
literature review covering climate change impacts on migration in the case of Bangladesh, 
presented in chapter 3, using the summary presented in annex 3 above. 
Some factors are duplicated to either show the difficulty of categorising the factor, or to 
display that some factors fit under several key points. For example the factor ‘emergency 
aid’ can be explained as a ‘Consequences of responsibility assignation’, while the lack of 
emergency aid can be described as a cause of CCIM.  
 
Key points for the perspectives Perspective 
 Climate refugees – climate change 
induced movement as the failure 
of mitigation and adaptation 
measures 
Climate migrants – climate 
change induced movement as a 
strategy for adaptation 
Definition Refugee Migrant 
View of migration Failure Adaptation strategy 
Nature of migration (4.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Different changes  different 
responses:  
- Long distance migration  long-
term/permanent resettlement;   
 
The kind of migration that climate 
impacts bring, as well as to what 
extent migration is voluntary, is 
hard to say  
 
Two links between adaptation and 
migration, both with pros and cons: 
- As an adaptation strategy: 
Risking security implications; 
- Adaptation to take away the need 
of relocation: Risking trapping 
populations. 
 
Increased urbanization 
Forced 
 
 
 
 
 
Sudden onset events: short-term 
and short-distance 
 
The lack of data makes it hard to 
estimate the number, thus 
international migration could be 
bigger than anticipated. 
 
Area’s most prone to experience 
climate change related hazards are 
situated close to the Indian border 
 
Destination areas for CCIM are 
already vulnerable  international 
migration 
 
 
Voluntary/distinction not 
useful/grey zone 
Environmental migration is part 
of human history 
Manageable/to be managed 
 
Slow onset events: long-term and 
long-distance 
 
Most CCIM is likely to remain 
internal 
 
Local migration: 
- Evacuation; 
-Already common coping-strategy. 
 
Circular/short-term migration: 
-To find alternative livelihoods. 
 
Indicating for increased 
international migration was found: 
-There exist already several 
international migration pathways 
from Bangladesh, especially to 
India; 
-Bangladesh has long been known 
as a labour sending country 
 
Most people migrating are likely to 
come from the wealthier and well 
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educated part of the population and 
international migration will 
manifest as a pragmatic livelihood 
strategy  
Responsibility (4.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Climate change related causes 
- Coastal erosion: on-going 
process. Sudden or slow process. 
Hard to predict 
 
 
 
Climate change, produced by 
Northern countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vulnerabilities affecting CCIM – 
the failure of mitigation and 
adaptation: 
-Poverty  no resources to 
relocate. Typically only well-off 
people and/or people with social 
networks undertake international 
migration  
- Sending remittances 
- Unemployment  
- Destruction of settlements 
- Destruction of livelihoods 
- Landlessness 
- Gender 
- Momentum 22 
 
 
 
 
Factors impacting on the decision 
to stay - Failure of 
mitigation/adaptation 
- No emergency aid 
- No possibility to take micro loans 
- No community networks 
- Lack of information about the 
option of migrating 
 
 
 
 
Climate change related causes 
- Floods: will increase, already part 
of living, people try to resettle on 
new land from sedimentation 
- Cyclones: will increase, already 
part of living, sudden and temporal 
displacement, disaster risk 
reduction can be effective 
- Increase in monsoons  increase 
in riverbank erosion. Hard to 
predict and already part of living 
Vulnerability (individualization 
of the responsibility or 
displacement on the ‘victims’ or 
its territory) 
 
Why Bangladesh is vulnerable to 
climate change impacts 
-Geographical position; 
- Dependence on natural resources 
for livelihoods; 
- Lack of adaptation measures/ 
disaster preparedness; 
- High population density. 
 
Vulnerabilities affecting CCIM: 
Underlying factors such as socio-
economic instability and 
underdevelopment already makes 
the population vulnerable to 
environmental hazards and climate 
change is likely to worsen 
vulnerability: 
-Poverty  no resources to 
relocate. Typically only well-off 
people and/or people with social 
networks undertake international 
migration  
- Unemployment  
- Destruction of settlements 
- Destruction of livelihoods 
- Landlessness 
- Gender 
 
Factors impacting on the decision 
to migrate - migration as 
an  adaptation strategy 
-Information about the option of 
migrating 
- Sending remittances 
- Better pay and more jobs 
elsewhere 
- Cultural/historical bonds  
- Social networks  
- Better income in other areas 
 
Climate change related causes 
- Floods: will increase, already part 
of living, people try to resettle on 
new land from sedimentation 
- Cyclones: will increase, already 
part of living, sudden and temporal 
displacement, disaster risk 
reduction can be effective 
- Increase in monsoons  increase 
in riverbank erosion. Hard to 
predict and already part of living 
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- Higher temperatures – seasonal 
variability negative impacts on 
agriculture 
- Changes in precipitation- 
seasonal variability negative 
impacts on agriculture 
- Decertification/drought 
- Salt-water intrusion is already a 
threat but likely to increase and the 
impacts on livelihoods can be 
severe 
- Sea-level rise: increase in floods, 
salt-water intrusion and worsen the 
gravity of storms. Slow-process – 
adaptation possible 
-Difficult to separate climate 
change impacts from ‘natural’ 
changes 
- Underlying factors such as 
poverty/socio-economic instability 
already makes the population 
vulnerably to environmental 
hazards and climate change is 
likely increase vulnerability 
Storylines (4.3) ‘Sinking islands’, ‘barbarian 
invasion’ 
‘Humanity on the move’ 
Consequences of migration (4.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased challenges for orderly 
development of cities, urban land 
use and urban economy, urban 
poverty, food insecurity and health 
problems. Risk of being exploited, 
including trafficking and 
harassments 
 
Terrorism and radicalization of 
groups within the country 
Ethnic conflicts and religious 
terrorism 
 
Conflicts over resources, especially 
in relation to rural-urban migration 
and thereby growing slums where 
little resources are available. 
 
Conflicts are especially likely in 
cases of sudden events resulting in 
mass-migration 
However, slow-onset events could 
result in more people displaced and 
thus environmental stress in the 
receiving areas. 
Environmental degradation in 
the receiving territory, which 
could result in violent conflicts 
 
 
 
The boarders of India have been 
increasingly securitized, to protect 
from immigrants 
 
Vulnerability as a result of CCIM – 
failure of  mitigation and 
adaptation 
-Risks associated with urban 
living, especially in slums  
-High debt levels 
-Landlessness 
- Fear of outbreaks of diseases in 
evacuation area/bad living 
conditions in evacuation areas 
- Poor educational options for 
children in evacuation areas 
- Dependency on external aid 
- Sending remittances 
If properly managed: new 
resources, remittances, 
knowledge transfer 
If left unmanaged: disruptions, 
degradation, violence 
 
Transfer of money (remittances), 
knowledge and technology are 
important benefits from 
international migration. 
 
The degree to which migration 
result in security issues dependent 
on the context of the area to which 
region migration takes place as 
well as the scale and nature of 
migration (sudden or gradual) 
 
“anti-Indianism” on the 
Bangladeshi political scene 
increases the likelihood of ethnic 
conflicts between Bangladeshi 
immigrants and Indians. Thus, 
future security issues related to 
CCIM into India will also depend 
on the development of national 
politics within Bangladesh. 
Climate policy (4.4) Mitigation Adaptation 
Institutional level (4.4) States 
International security 
International law 
Individuals/communities 
Human security 
Human rights 
Form of the law (4.4) New international convention or 
treaty 
Soft laws, internalization in 
domestic policies, policies 
diffusion 
Uses of ‘climate 
refugees/migrants’ (4.4) 
To underline the human 
consequences of climate change 
To underline the responsibilities 
of Northern countries 
To strengthen refugee/migration 
laws in receiving countries 
Replacement of mitigation policy 
by adaptation policy 
Promoting the ‘migration 
management’ and the 
institutional reform agenda 
As a source of labour-power in 
the North 
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Consequences of responsibility 
assignation (4.4) 
 
Climate change mitigation 
Reparation (funding for 
adaptation to climate change, 
taking-in of climate refugees…) 
 
To develop strategies for out-
migration in collaboration with 
Bangladesh’s neighbouring 
countries to encourage migration 
that would also be economically 
favourable is a way to lessen the 
tension 
 
Evidence of migration as an 
adaptation strategy are somewhat 
contesting and depends on e.g. 
resources in the receiving area as 
well as the impact in question. 
Migration as a response to disasters 
is not common, however if 
migration occurs as a way of 
addressing future risks, it could be 
seen as adaptation to climate 
change impacts 
 
‘Capacity’ building of vulnerable 
countries 
Building ‘Resilience’ of 
vulnerable population 
 
To develop strategies for out-
migration in collaboration with 
Bangladesh’s neighbouring 
countries to encourage migration 
that would also be economically 
favourable is a way to lessen the 
tension 
 
Evidence of migration as an 
adaptation strategy are somewhat 
contesting and depends on e.g. 
resources in the receiving area as 
well as the impact in question. 
Migration as a response to disasters 
is not common, however if 
migration occurs as a way of 
addressing future risks, it could be 
seen as adaptation to climate 
change impacts 
 
Reducing vulnerability in the 
context of CCIM - successful 
adaptation: 
- Existence of emergency aid 
- Possibility to take micro loans 
- Community networks 
 
Preparing urban areas for increased 
immigration 
 
Recognition of problems related to 
urbanization on different levels of 
decision-making and collaboration 
between levels 
 
Migration should be part of a 
holistic approach to climate change 
adaptation 
 
Conflicts can be avoided if actions 
are taken to ease the migration: 
Stronger focus on human security; 
Planned migration can be a way to 
address insecurity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
